Is "Acceptingness" A Parental Virtue?

I just read two interesting articles by Rosalind McDougall on parental virtue and reproduction. The first is "Parental Virtue: A New Way of Thinking About the Morality of Reproductive Actions" in Bioethics Vol21(4), 2007 and "Acting Parentally: An Argument Against Sex Selection" in Journal of Medical Ethics 31, 2005.

These papers are of particular interest to me as I have argued (here) that a virtue ethics approach to reproduction can view some pre-natal interventions (like genetic enhancement) as not only morally permissible, but as *morally required*. One of the distinctive features of McDougall’s approach, which I think explains the somewhat different conclusions we arrive at, concerns what she calls the virtue of "acceptingness". She argues that it is an intrinsic feature of a child that his or her characteristics will be, to some extent, unpredictable. And "this fact renders acceptingness a parental character trait conducive to the flourishing of the child and thus a parental virtue" (PV, 185).

This is an interesting way to think of parental virtue, and I thought I would offer some of my initial thoughts about it here.

Let’s begin with the claim that it is an intrinsic feature of a child that their characteristics will be, to some extent, unpredictable. I think a lot hinges on the issue of “to some extent”. I am willing to grant this. But at the same time I think the notion of acceptingness threatens the concern for flourishing which, as McDougall acknowledges, is the cornerstone of the virtue ethics account of reproduction.

Take height. The precise height your child will reach in adulthood is somewhat unpredictable. No prenatal genetic test will give you a precise estimate of height. Environmental factors like the diet the child consumes is vital for their height. However, the genes the child inherits do impact the likelihood that the child will, with proper nourishment, fall between a certain min and max height.

Consider now cancer. The precise likelihood that your child will die of cancer before reaching the age 60 is somewhat unpredictable. No prenatal genetic test will give you a precise estimate of all cancer risk. Environmental factors like lifestyle, smoking, stress, etc. are important risk-factors for complex diseases like cancer. However, the genes the child inherits do impact the likelihood that the child will, even with proper nourishment and lifestyle, fall below or above the average risk for developing certain cancers.

Consider now intelligence. The precise IQ your child will attain during adulthood is somewhat unpredictable. No prenatal genetic test will give you a precise estimate of potential for intelligence. Environmental factors like parental care, education, diet, exercise, etc. are vital for a complex phenotype like intelligence. However, the genes the child inherits do impact the likelihood that the child will, even with a loving home, decent education, etc, fall below or above the average IQ.

Okay, so I can appreciate how invoking the notion of acceptingness as a virtue would dissuade parents from pursuing prenatal interventions that promised to deliver predictable traits that simply are not predictable. For example, if a parent believed that there was a gene for artistic expression and wanted a child with that gene so they could become the next Picasso. But it seems to me that such scenarios can be ruled out of hand by simply saying that virtuous parents would not make procreative decisions that were based on bogus assumptions about genetic determinism. So a virtuous parent would not undergo PGD to screen for the artistic embryo, or subject a fetus to a prenatal artistic enhancement, because these things would not be achievable (so virtuous parents are not stupid). Furthermore, planning the specifics of your child’s life like this would compromise a child's right to an open future. And thus a parent compromises a child’s opportunity for flourishing by having some specific lifeplan in mind (e.g. “You are going to be a great artist!"). But I don’t think we need to classify “acceptingness” as a parental virtue in order to get us to that conclusion.

Furthermore, I think the notion of acceptingness threatens genuine parental virtue (and the flourishing of one’s offspring). Part of the difficulty that I have with the notion of “accepting” a child’s characteristics is that it overlooks the central function virtuous parents are to play in their children’s lives: to help their children flourish. A child is not born with a set of “characteristics”, rather these characteristics evolve over the course of a child’s development, through adolescence and continue to develop for the rest of a person’s life. No one ever reaches a stage where this process stops, and one then has a fixed, stagnate list of characteristics.

For example, when one’s child is aged 3 they will have particular characteristics in terms of their intelligence, sociability, etc. But a virtuous parent will hope these characteristics develop, and they will play an active role in ensuring this occurs. So by the time the child reaches age 13 they have a different set of characteristics that they did not (and probably could not) possess at age 3 (reading, writing, riding a bike, etc.). And so on.

So even though a child’s characteristics are unpredictable, a virtuous parent will seek to pursue environmental interventions that reduce the likelihood of certain characteristics becoming part of their child. For example: traits like being stunted, malnourished, illiterate, impaired, etc. And they will seek to increase the likelihood that their children will come to acquire other characteristics. Namely, those that a flourishing agent possesses (e.g. friendship, health, practical reason, etc.).

I guess I remain puzzled as to why the notion of acceptingness would be construed as a trait of a virtuous parent. I can see some of the attraction, in the sense that it shows us why the “control freak” parent acts contrary to virtue. But I don’t think it is hard to see their shortcomings. Such parents impair their child’s opportunity for flourishing by enforcing a particular, detailed future on them- thus stifling a child’s individuality and imagination. But I believe a virtuous parent will play a proactive role in shaping the phenotypes of their children so that they can achieve eudaimonia. And the notion of “acceptingness” seems to run counter to what I take to be integral to virtuous parenting.

Let me conclude then by tying this up with the issue of intervening in the genotype of one’s offspring (e.g. through prenatal therapy or enhancement). Because a child’s opportunity for flourishing will be profoundly impacted by both their genes and their environment, virtuous parents should not rule out of hand the duty to intervene in either. A prenatal intervention to remedy a single-gene disease like CF, or an intervention that seeks to reduce the life-expected risk of cancer, are virtuous actions. Similarly, parents that take reasonable steps to ensure their children are physically active and don’t “hangout with the wrong crowd” are virtuous. In all these cases the parents, assuming the means pursued are not risky, ineffective or too intrusive, are acting virtuous. They are taking reasonable steps to increase the likelihood that their children will live flourishing lives. And this proactive attitude is warranted because these children are *their children*.

While I agree that there is a sense in which acceptingness can be virtuous, I don’t think it makes sense to call it a parental virtue. Primarily because a child is constantly developing and thus there is nothing that a parent can really be said to accept (other than the fact that traits are somewhat unpredictable). Sure virtuous parents will recognize the individuality of their children, even their limitations (e.g. “He’ll never be a soccer star!”), but that doesn’t mean they accept the traits their children happen to have at any given age as things beyond parental concern and involvement. Virtuous parents are a positive, formative influence on their children’s lives.

Cheers,
Colin

More Thoughts on the Virtue of "Acceptingness"

Last night I was reflecting some more on my previous post about "acceptingness" as a parental virtue. I suspect an important part of my unease could be addressed if we stipulated that virtuous parents ought only to be accepting of those things that are in fact beyond their influence or control but less so about those things that are not. So if we think in terms of Aristotle's idea of the mean, virtuous parents occupy the mean between the parent who says "hey, life is unpredictable so why bother to care for my children as there is no 100% guarantee my hard work and love will secure their flourishing!" versus the control freak parent who says "I want to control every specific detail of my child's life, even if this is impossible!". But I don't think the notion of "acceptingness" helps capture the idea that parental virtue occupies the mean, which I think is essential for a virtue theory. And this is so because I don't think most human characteristics are fixed and stagnant. That is why I have trouble thinking of "acceptingness" as a virtue.

Here is an example to illustrate my point. Suppose the following tragic accident occurs. A parent witnesses their child lose a leg in an accident with the lawn mower. In such a tragic scenario it is now true that the child possesses the characteristic of being a leg amputee. How does acceptingness play out in this context? Should a virtuous parent accept that this accident is just part of the unpredictable nature of life? In one sense "yes", but in another sense "no".

At the time of the accident the child could suffer much more than just the harm of losing a leg. They might also bleed to death without immediate medical treatment. So the parent will immediately seek medical intervention. Perhaps the parent can accept (after a few days) that the child's leg is lost, but they will not accept that the child's life may be lost. They will do everything they can to save their child's life (and leg if it is possible), no matter how small the chance of survival. And if the child does survive, the parent will help the child adapt to life with one functioning leg. "Accepting" that life is unpredictable and can result in tragic accidents does not mean mean a virtuous parent will not aspire to minimize the risks of harm where possible (and reasonable).

According to the account of parental virtue I want to endorse (see here), the question of whether acceptingness is a parental virtue depends on whether it makes sense to consider it a personal virtue. This is so, for me, because I premise parental love on self-love. A parent views their child as "another-self" (Aristotle NE 1161b19, 28).

So, is a virtuous agent "accepting" of their own characteristics? Well, maybe we should modify this a bit as a virtuous agent has humility and strives for, but may never attain, complete 100% virtue. So the more interesting question is: are those who are pretty much virtuous- but still less than perfect moral agents- and aspire to be yet even more virtuous, "accepting" of themselves?

My initial reaction is to say "no". We constantly strive to become more enlightened, more compassionate and understanding, etc. There never is a stage where we just say: "This is the way I am, so I don't need to grow or critically reflect any further!". No perfectly (or even just partially) virtuous agent would say this. Self-love entails a life-long commitment to critical self-reflection on how we live our lives. The same applies to the child-parent relationship, though as a child ages (and becomes an adult themselves) the dynamic of the parent-child relationship changes significantly. The parent's role becomes more "accepting" in the sense that, once their children possesses the capacities of autonomy, parents should restrain their desire to intervene (no matter how good willed their intentions might be). So maybe acceptance becomes more of a virtue when the parent and child are both adults? I'd have to think some more about that.

And perhaps acceptingness is also a personal virtue of sorts. It might help a virtuous agent deal with sudden life changes, like retirement, divorce or the death of a loved one. Or even not-so-sudden life changes, like a "mid-life" crisis. Accepting, for example, the human life cycle, and our own inevitable decline of physical capacities (e.g. reproductive functions, levels of vitality, etc.).

However, this does not lead us in the direction of not trying to mitigate, or postpone, these things if this is possible. Physical exercise and diet, for example, can expand our health span. And the more I think about these issues the more I see how they relate to another ongoing interest of my-- the duty to retard human aging. Maybe I'll say more about the link between these two things on another occasion. But I do think part of the unease some have with the aspiration to retard human aging is that it goes against the notion of "acceptingness". However, once we understand that aging is not immutable, AND we are clear on what virtues follow from self-love, then I don't think we will feel this unease. But a fuller examination of these issues will have to wait for another day!

Cheers,
Colin

Virtue Ethics and Enhancement Paper

My paper "Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement" has been accepted for publication in the new online journal Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology. This is timely as the interesting debate I participated in this week over at Crooked Timber was on this very topic!

While prenatal enhancement is a very speculative intervention, it is an interesting case to consider because it raises important issues pertaining to parental love and virtue (which underlies my virtue ethics approach). Furthermore, the prospect of parent's having a role in influencing the genetic endowments of their offspring is something that many prominent critics have argued against (see here and here). I think it is a mistake to eschew these potential technologies. And so I thought writing a paper on this topic would be fun and interesting, and it might help raise some countervailing insights to both the critics of such interventions and to those who favour these interventions but adopt an explicit consequentialist approach.

Here is the abstract to the paper:

In this paper I argue that the virtue ethics tradition can enhance the moral discourse on the ethics of prenatal genetic enhancements in distinctive and valuable ways. Virtue ethics prescribes we adopt a much more provisional stance on the issue of the moral permissibility of prenatal genetic enhancements. A stance that places great care on differentiating between the different stakes involved with developing different phenotypes in our children and the different possible means (environmental vs genetic manipulation) available to parents for pursuing legitimate concerns of parental love and virtue. Key components of the virtue ethics account of morality, such as the Aristotelian account of happiness, love and the doctrine of the mean, provide an adequate basis for rejecting the claim that it is morally impermissible for parents to pursue (safe and effective) prenatal enhancements. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that a virtue ethics account of morality could actually support the stronger claim that utilising such interventions can (in certain contexts) be morally required.

While my argument is not quite"The Case in Favour of Perfection", a more accurate description would be "The Case for Not Prejudging How Parents Can Best Help Their Children Flourish!".

One of the main reasons I like a virtue ethics approach to this issue is that the devil is in the details. And so if we imagine what a virtuous parent would do, if faced with the prospect of being able to increase (by utilising an enhancement) the likelihood that their child could live a flourishing life, we realise that much depends on the particulars at play (what other resources the parent has at their avail, what the enhancement in question is, etc.). And so I think bringing these insights to the fore might help us keep a more open mind concerning the ethics of enhancing interventions.

Cheers,
Colin

Risk and Virtue

I have posted a number of times before on the issue of risk and on the virtues of parenting. So today I offer some brief reflections on the intersection of these two themes.

Firstly, some general thoughts on risk. You can’t completely avoid risk of harm. Indeed, to live is to risk pain, suffering and death. But responsible moral agents (let’s call them *virtuous agents*) will adopt a reflective, critical attitude towards different kinds of risks.

Virtuous agents will pursue some risks, especially when the benefits far outweigh the potential losses. In many cases this is pretty obvious. By driving to work today I took the risk of getting in a car accident. But this is a risk worth taking for the payoff of having the life I would like to have the opportunity to live.

Of course my decision to drive to work, even though it has some risk of harm, could fall anywhere on the spectrum from remote to certainty depending on my driving behaviour and other factors (e.g. fitness of my vehicle, weather). It would be irresponsible to drive to work at hazardous speeds, ignoring traffic regulations, or driving with a flat tire or in a severe winter storm. So while I am willing to accept the risks that come with commuting to work each day, even that mundane risk is subjected to provisos and limits. And a virtuous agent will internalize these kinds of considerations for a variety of different activities and risks.

Another obvious example- living a physically active lifestyle. Many challenges face a virtuous agent as they attempt to find the mean between someone who endangers their own health by living an inactive lifestyle and someone who pursues their health in a non-virtuous fashion. The former is rather obvious, but how can one violate virtue in the latter extreme? There are many possible ways that an excessive fixation on one’s physical health could be taken to an extreme. Firstly, if one is over zealous in their exercise they might actually compromise the very thing one aspires to achieve- namely their health. For example, they might suffer a chronic injury due to overtraining. Or if one focuses exclusively on such a goal, to the detriment of other laudable goals (like their mental health, parental responsibilities, etc.) then the extreme of physical fitness can actually be a vice (though not the worst of possible vices).

OK, now a couple of thoughts on parental virtue. Recall this earlier post and paper. I believe parenting poses a number of complex and interesting challenges for the moral development of a parent. And how a parent responds to the potential risks their children will be exposed to is an enormous challenge for any parent, even (aspiring) virtuous parents.

There is an innate parental instinct to protect our children from risks of harm. This is a good thing that increases the likelihood that our children will make it to adulthood! And anyone who has had the joy of raising a child will know the endless possible mishaps a rambunctious child can get into. From wanting to stick everything they find in their mouth (ranging from coins, to dirt and, well, you name it, and a one year old will try to eat it!), to trying to crawl down a flight of stairs and touching hot ovens, a parent only really gets the opportunity to relax and turn off the “What is he/she into now!” button once the young child is finally asleep in bed.

As a child ages, and their own cognitive capacities develop, the parent’s burden of risk management evolves. I say “evolves”, rather than becomes easier because, while it is true that some risks of harm become less likely (like your child unwittingly wandering into a busy road), there are many new risks that come as your child takes on new responsibilities and matures. So there are dangers like drugs, crime, etc. And so a parent will have to learn how to manage these new challenges, drawing on the experiences they have learned from during the early years of caring for the child and their own personal experiences of dealing with such complex issues.

And so this finally brings me to the issue that motivated me to write this post—cultivating risk-taking in one’s children. In my own personal experience, this is perhaps one of the hardest challenges I have faced. We teach our children to obey the rules of the game, to look both ways before crossing, to wear their bike helmets, … but how do you teach them to take the risks that could enhance their lives in ways those who are risk adverse will never experience? Some of the most valuable things in life require risk-taking, like love and friendship. And so permitting your children to learn how to manage risk is an important life skill that a parent can either stifle or cultivate.

After dinner tonight I took my two oldest (though still young) sons out on their bikes, the first real bike ride of the year. In an attempt to help foster some of these traits I pointed out a dirt hill that I thought it might be interesting for them to ride down. At first they expressed some concern that it might not be safe to ride their bikes on this hill. I thought it might be fun, provided they were careful. Sensing that even “protective Daddy” thought it would be OK, they decided to give it a go. They loved it! And I just sat their watching the two of them driving down this hill, as their confidence grew and grew. They even suffered a few minor bumps and scraps, but nothing so grave as to deter them from doing it again and again. Allowing them to take even this small risk was a big step for me.

As I watched the two of them riding their bikes down this small dirt hill I realized how much (and fast!) they have grown. And how hard it has been for me to relax the parental impulse to protect them from all possible risks. But I now realize that doing so has its own risks. It risks them going through life always pursuing the save option- never risking love for fear of a broken heart, never risking friendship for fear it would not be reciprocated, never risking dissent for fear of social disapproval. I wouldn’t want my children to live in a world of people like that.

Experiences like tonight make me appreciate just how incredible parenting is. It permits one to revisit their own youth (I was quite a risk taker myself when I was their age!) and engage in a unique and powerful process of self-discovery and growth. No doubt many more challenges lay ahead for us in the years to come, as we all continue to grow and learn from experience. But that is what living a human life is all about.

Cheers,
Colin

How Poverty Impacts Brain Development

The family we are born into has a profound influence on our life prospects. Indeed, from the earliest stages of fetal development, the diet and behaviour (e.g. smoking, consumption of drugs and alcohol, etc) of a prospective mother can significantly influence the physical and mental development of a child.

This study, for example, suggests that permanent vascular damage attributable to tobacco smoke exposure might be initiated in gestation. According to the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, prenatal exposure to alcohol is the most common cause of birth defects. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome can cause facial deformities, slow development and neurological problems.

This study in the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (and is covered in today's Globe) examines how postnatal poverty affects the brain development of children. Here is the abstract:

Social inequalities have profound effects on the physical and mental health of children. Children from low socioeconomic (SES) backgrounds perform below children from higher SES backgrounds on tests of intelligence and academic achievement, and recent findings indicate that low SES (LSES) children are impaired on behavioral measures of prefrontal function. However, the influence of socioeconomic disparity on direct measures of neural activity is unknown. Here, we provide electrophysiological evidence indicating that prefrontal function is altered in LSES children. We found that prefrontal-dependent electrophysiological measures of attention were reduced in LSES compared to high SES (HSES) children in a pattern similar to that observed in patients with lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) damage. These findings provide neurophysiological evidence that social inequalities are associated with alterations in PFC function in LSES children. There are a number of factors associated with LSES rearing conditions that may have contributed to these results such as greater levels of stress and lack of access to cognitively stimulating materials and experiences. Targeting specific prefrontal processes affected by socioeconomic disparity could be helpful in developing intervention programs for LSES children.

Of particular interest are the kinds of environmental interventions that influence the brain development of children. The study notes the following: that environmental complexity can augment brain development; children from poor families have less to exposure to cognitively stimulating materials and experience greater levels of stress.

These insights have important implications for two ongoing areas of interest to me. Firstly, debates about parental virtue and genetic intervention (see these entries). This study clearly shows how rich and poor parents influence the brain development of their children by their exposure (or lack of exposure) to different environments. So parents influence, for good or bad, the biology of their children. Keeping this fact in mind can help us make sense of the ethics of seeking to cultivate phenotypes via direct biological interventions (e.g. genetic or pharmaceutical intervention). In the case of environmental interventions, the goal is not to reduce inequality by preventing rich parents from exposing their children to the environments that promote brain development. Rather the goal is to try to bring disadvantaged children up to this higher level of development.

So the concern at stake here is really prioritarian rather than egalitarian. And those concerned about the impact of poverty on children ought to be interested in the potential benefits that the biomedical sciences (especially research on the brain) could yield. To those who balk at such a suggestion and think tackling poverty itself is much easier, well, this study shows how complex and difficult the challenges really are. In the ideal world every child would be born into an environment where they are exposed to the kinds of stimulations that augment their brains in the ways most conducive to flourishing. But if a pharmaceutical intervention could be prescribed that would mimic the brain development of being exposed to these environmental complexities, would it really be better to forfeit them in the name of achieving brain development via "traditional (yet unequally accessible) means"? It is easy to wave our arms around and say "drugs won't be equally accessible to all" but the same is true of complex environments. Indeed, it is impossible to ensure all receive exposure to the same environments. But a pharmaceutical intervention could help us satisfy a principle of sufficiency for brain development in children. And that would be an incredible accomplishment (and may arrive sooner than you think).

Secondly, this kind of study helps bring precision to what it is about socio-economic inequality that is objectionable. The problem is not that that some people have more money than others; rather, it is that the brains of some children are not exposed to the kinds of complex environments that cause the brain development we believe all children should achieve. How can we best remedy this situation? Rather than just looking to redistributing wealth, we are more likely to see that a wide array of measures are necessary. These range from trying to reduce teenage pregnancy and the demands placed on working parents, to supporting better public education and scientific research on the brain. Humane societies that seek to treat future generations with the care and respect they deserve ought to foster a culture supportive of the family, science and parental virtue.

Cheers,
Colin

Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement

My paper "Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement" is now available in the first issue of the new journal Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology. The issue is dedicated to the topic of human enhancement. Here is a lengthy sample of my argument:

In this paper I argue that the virtue ethics tradition can enhance the moral discourse on genetic enhancements in distinctive and valuable ways. Virtue ethics prescribes we adopt a much more provisional stance on the issue of the moral permissibility of prenatal genetic enhancement. This means great care will be placed on differentiating between the different stakes involved with developing different phenotypes in our children and the different possible means (environmental vs genetic manipulation) available to parents for pursuing legitimate concerns of parental love and virtue.

Key components of the virtue ethics account of morality, such as the Aristotelian account of happiness, love and the doctrine of the mean, provide an adequate basis for rejecting the claim that it is morally impermissible for parents to pursue (safe and effective) prenatal enhancements. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that a virtue ethics account of morality could actually support the stronger claim that utilising such interventions can (in certain contexts) be morally required.

....So our question is: would virtuous parents pursue prenatal enhancement of a child who is expected, assuming they are exposed to a particular bundle of environmental interventions (e.g. nutritious diet, safe home environment, education, etc.), to fall within “normal species functioning”? As I shall emphasise shortly, much of course hinges on the assumption concerning the available environmental interventions a parent will (likely) have at their avail.

....Virtuous parents will recognise that many formative environmental interventions are multifaceted. That is, they serve many laudable aims at once. So parents read to their children, not only as a way to develop the cognitive capabilities of their children, but also as a way of spending time with a child, forging the psychological connectedness and continuity necessary for true love and friendship. Reading stories together provides the child and parent with shared experiences (e.g. the adventures of Pooh Bear, etc.) from which they can have further discussions and reflections. These stories will relate, in different ways, to the ups and down of real life. Sharing such stories helps a parent and child address issues like friendship, morality, happiness, human history, etc.

Sharing these experiences with one’s child not only enriches a child’s cognitive capabilities and moral development, and the bond between the parent and child, but it also enhances the parent’s own practical deliberation. It permits the parent to re-visit, in intimate ways, the psychology of childhood again; its naivety, fears and optimism. And this enhances a parent’s practical deliberation and better positions them to relate in virtuous ways with their children as well as others.

Virtuous parents will not pursue genetic enhancements as a substitute for providing the formative environmental interventions necessary for human flourishing. Virtuous parents know that a child’s needs change over time, as the circumstances influencing their lives (e.g. their school, friends, diet, hobbies, etc.)change. No “one-off” prenatal genetic enhancement will replace the judicious judgement of fine-tuned environmental interventions that are shaped and developed to meet a child’s particular needs over the course of their physical, psychological and moral development...

As the father of three I really enjoyed writing this paper and thinking about these issues. And the argument developed in the paper actually expresses my own (not yet fully developed) perfectionist conception of the good life. And this account of ethics is something I have only recently come to endorse. I plan on doing a future post on how I switched from being a non-perfectionist liberal to a perfectionist liberal. But this paper captures some of the central ideas that have helped me re-shape my thoughts about what constitutes the good life. And forging caring, loving relationships is the cornerstone of this vision of ethics. And so I think the issue of enhancing one's offspring (whether through biological or environmental intervention) is a useful way of getting to the heart of some very important moral issues.

As I noted earlier, my argument is not quite "The Case in Favour of Perfection". A more accurate description would be "The Case for Not Prejudging How Parents Can Best Help Their Children Flourish!".

Cheers,
Colin

Virtue Ethics and Enhancement Paper (now online)

My paper "Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement" is now available in the first issue of the new journal Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology. The issue is dedicated to the topic of human enhancement. Here is a lengthy sample of my argument:

In this paper I argue that the virtue ethics tradition can enhance the moral discourse on genetic enhancements in distinctive and valuable ways. Virtue ethics prescribes we adopt a much more provisional stance on the issue of the moral permissibility of prenatal genetic enhancement. This means great care will be placed on differentiating between the different stakes involved with developing different phenotypes in our children and the different possible means (environmental vs genetic manipulation) available to parents for pursuing legitimate concerns of parental love and virtue.

Key components of the virtue ethics account of morality, such as the Aristotelian account of happiness, love and the doctrine of the mean, provide an adequate basis for rejecting the claim that it is morally impermissible for parents to pursue (safe and effective) prenatal enhancements. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that a virtue ethics account of morality could actually support the stronger claim that utilising such interventions can (in certain contexts) be morally required.

....So our question is: would virtuous parents pursue prenatal enhancement of a child who is expected, assuming they are exposed to a particular bundle of environmental interventions (e.g. nutritious diet, safe home environment, education, etc.), to fall within “normal species functioning”? As I shall emphasise shortly, much of course hinges on the assumption concerning the available environmental interventions a parent will (likely) have at their avail.

....Virtuous parents will recognise that many formative environmental interventions are multifaceted. That is, they serve many laudable aims at once. So parents read to their children, not only as a way to develop the cognitive capabilities of their children, but also as a way of spending time with a child, forging the psychological connectedness and continuity necessary for true love and friendship. Reading stories together provides the child and parent with shared experiences (e.g. the adventures of Pooh Bear, etc.) from which they can have further discussions and reflections. These stories will relate, in different ways, to the ups and down of real life. Sharing such stories helps a parent and child address issues like friendship, morality, happiness, human history, etc.

Sharing these experiences with one’s child not only enriches a child’s cognitive capabilities and moral development, and the bond between the parent and child, but it also enhances the parent’s own practical deliberation. It permits the parent to re-visit, in intimate ways, the psychology of childhood again; its naivety, fears and optimism. And this enhances a parent’s practical deliberation and better positions them to relate in virtuous ways with their children as well as others.

Virtuous parents will not pursue genetic enhancements as a substitute for providing the formative environmental interventions necessary for human flourishing. Virtuous parents know that a child’s needs change over time, as the circumstances influencing their lives (e.g. their school, friends, diet, hobbies, etc.)change. No “one-off” prenatal genetic enhancement will replace the judicious judgement of fine-tuned environmental interventions that are shaped and developed to meet a child’s particular needs over the course of their physical, psychological and moral development...

As the father of three I really enjoyed writing this paper and thinking about these issues. And the argument developed in the paper actually expresses my own (not yet fully developed) perfectionist conception of the good life. And this account of ethics is something I have only recently come to endorse. I plan on doing a future post on how I switched from being a non-perfectionist liberal to a perfectionist liberal. But this paper captures some of the central ideas that have helped me re-shape my thoughts about what constitutes the good life. And forging caring, loving relationships is the cornerstone of this vision of ethics. And so I think the issue of enhancing one's offspring (whether through biological or environmental intervention) is a useful way of getting to the heart of some very important moral issues.

As I noted earlier, my argument is not quite "The Case in Favour of Perfection". A more accurate description would be "The Case for Not Prejudging How Parents Can Best Help Their Children Flourish!".

Cheers,
Colin

PGD paper

I am writing this post on my return train journey from Exeter to Oxford. I just spent the last three days at an excellent interdisciplinary conference on “Governing Genomics”, organized by Egenis. I’ve been to Exeter a few times before for various conferences in the past, and it is a very beautiful campus.

This morning I presented my paper on regulating the non-medical uses of PGD. I actually presented this same paper just last week to a group of philosophers at the James Martin advanced research seminar at Oxford, so it was a nice contrast to receive back-to-back feedback from a group of philosophers and then a group of (primarily) non-philosophers. Receiving feedback from scholars in different disciplines, with different interests and expertise, is useful for a whole host of reasons. It exposes you to different ways of looking at an issue, or new dilemmas or hard cases or possible solutions that you might not have entertained.

The goal of my paper is to explore a normative framework for addressing the issue of regulating non-medical uses of PGD. And in this blog I will outline some of the preliminary thoughts that motivated me to develop the position I take in the paper, though I will not (at least now) get to the real details and heart of my argument. But writing this blog has been useful to me nonetheless as it has compelled me to make explicit some of the more general concerns explored in the paper.

Firstly, what is PGD? Preimplantation genetic diagnosis involves screening embryos before they are implanted in a women’s uterus. Parents who undergo IVF can have their embryos screened for a variety of genetic disorders. This screening process involves removing one or two cells from a three-day old (eight-celled) embryo. You can do this without jeopardizing the integrity of the embryos. Once they are tested, a more informed decision can be made concerning which, if any, of those embryos should be implanted. You can learn more about PGD here.


Some believe that even permitting the medical uses of PGD is controversial (see here ). But in my paper I focus on a much more controversial (and thus, for a philosopher, more interesting!) range of issues- regulating the non-medical uses of PGD. Currently it is possible to utilize PGD to screen for the gender of embryos though this is banned in both Canada and the United Kingdom. And one could envision, as science progresses further, new screening capabilities becoming possible, testing not only for the likelihood of developing disease, or gender, but for complex phenotypes like behavioral characteristics. What should we be willing to say about this prospect? Do we want to permit parents to have these new discretionary powers to influence the phenotypes of their offspring? This raises fundamental questions about the scope and limits of reproductive freedom. And it is important that we start thinking about these issues now so we are prepared to meet the ethical and legal challenges that lay ahead in the years to come.

It is of course worth noting that we currently give parents a vast amount of discretionary power to influence the life prospects of their children and potential offspring. Not only are we free to decide if we want to have children in the first place, how many, and when; but expecting mothers can pursue environmental interventions (e.g. diet, abortion) that have a profound impact on a child’s (and potential child's) wellbeing. And once a child is born parents have a vast degree of discretionary power to influence the physical, intellectual and moral development of their children.

This parental freedom is of course limited by a principle of no harm. If the actions or omissions of a parent threaten the safety and wellbeing of a child (or potential child) the state may legitimately intervene. But beyond satisfying the minimalist requirement of a duty of no harm, parents are free to influence the development of a whole variety of phenotypes. Lets call this state of affairs the “status quo”. And the interesting question is: will the status quo equip us to address the complex ethical and legal concerns which the genetic revolution raises? I think it will not. Before I say why let me outline what I anticipate those who defend the status quo will argue.

At this stage one might be inclined to say that regulating the non-medical uses of PGD should simply be subject to the same standards (i.e. the “status quo”) that we invoke in the larger case of reproductive and parental freedom. In other words, non-medical uses of PGD should be permitted provided they do not pose a significant risk of perceptible damage to an identifiable individual. So, for example, they should be prohibited if and only if such screening technologies pose a significant risk of harm to the prospective mother or the embryos that are implanted.

Those liberals and libertarians inclined to take this stance will thus want the discussion to end there. If something like Mill’s liberty principle has not been contravened, then we should permit liberty to reign unabated. End of debate.

But this is not my stance. And it’s not for a variety of reasons. One reason is that, while I would probably be inclined to defend the status quo in the pre(genetic) revolutionary context, I would not defend it in the post-revolutionary context. The reason is that my defense of the status quo is, in large part, pragmatic rather than principled. I do not believe, by virtue of giving birth to a person, that one is (unconditionally) morally entitled to play such a formative role in influencing the development of their offspring.

So if the status quo is defensible (and I’m open to the possibility that it may not be) it is not defensible by reference *solely* to a principle of no harm or the autonomy of parents. Rather, it’s that society could not (without huge expense, invasion of privacy, and other bad consequences etc.) regulate what goes in the family to ensure parents satisfy more than a duty of no harm. Parents are morally required to do a lot more than satisfy the principle of no harm. They are obligated to *love* their children, which goes way beyond the duty of no harm. But to legally compel parents to love their children is not something the state could effectively do and it would probably do a good deal of harm when trying to compel parents to love their children. (note: though there might be non-coercive measures, like creating incentives, that could better secure these goals without those costs. So the state could take the cultivation of parental love to be a goal, its just not something to be achieved through coercion).

This is worth pointing out because a prohibition on non-medical uses of PGD (as well as prenatal genetic modification) is interesting because it may prove to be an effective way to limit parental discretionary power in a way does not have all the negative costs of trying to limit that freedom after a child is born. Rather than trying to police the family we could simply prohibit fertility clinics from offering PGD to parents who undergo IVF. So for me there is no principled defense of the status quo. Rather, given a number of background considerations- about the way the family functions, and the limits of what can be achieved through state coercion, etc. something like the status quo is probably a reasonable position to take in the pre-revolutionary context. But possibly not in the post-revolutionary context.

So, what do I argue then? In the paper I defend a normative framework that I think can help us grapple with the different concerns that arise in case of permitting non-medical uses of PGD. That normative framework is not the standard philosophical arguments one encounters in ethics and political philosophy (e.g. Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, etc.), but rather it’s the theory deliberative democracy. Recall my post on the rise of deliberative democracy. There are of course many versions of the ideal of deliberative democracy. But I focus on the specific version advanced by Gutmann and Thompson in their excellent (second book) entitled Why Deliberative Democracy?

I won’t go through all the details of why I think this normative theory is useful for the particular debates concerning non-medical uses of PGD, but let me just briefly highlight two important parts of the theory that are vital for this particular policy issue.

Firstly, deliberative democracy is a “second-order” social theory rather than a “first-order” theory. First-order theories seek to win a philosophical argument; they attempt to resolve moral disagreement by showing that rival principles should be rejected. So libertarians will argue that concerns of equality, or the fact that there is popular opposition to gender selection for family balancing, are not legitimate grounds for overriding reproductive freedom. Conversely, some feminists might be inclined to argue that reproductive freedom does not include the freedom to have a child of a particular kind, thus a ban on gender selection is not liberty-restricting and thus a ban should be imposed because it protects equality. And procedural democrats might be inclined to invoke the fact that there is popular opposition to these uses of PGD as a justification for a ban. All of these kinds of debates are first-order arguments. The aim is to show that liberty, equality, or the aggregation of preferences should win the day in terms of determining if we should permit non-medical uses of PGD like gender selection.

This can be contrasted with a second-order theory like deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy is a second-order theory in that it seeks to find a reasonable balance between the conflicting values and principles that arise in the debate among first-order theories. So rather than championing a principle of liberty, equality, or democracy, deliberative democracy is a *pluralistic public ethic*, one that seeks to give due attention to a diverse range of substantive and procedural values. This makes it very useful when tackling the issue of regulating non-medical uses of PGD. For a diverse range of values and principles arise in this context. And the real challenge we face is determining what would constitute a reasonable balance between respect for reproductive freedom, equality and democratic law-making.

So the idea of exploring a second-order analysis of the stakes involved in debates over gender selection and other uses of PGD is, I think, a novel and important endeavor to pursue. It gives us a much more inclusive normative framework than the standard liberal strategy of invoking Mill’s harm principle.

The second distinctive feature of deliberative democracy that I think is very important when examining the issue of PGD is Gutmann and Thompson’s emphasis on the idea of “provisionality”. This means that the principles of deliberative democracy are both morally and politically provisional. They must be open to revision in light of new moral insights and empirical discoveries. And this is vital for ensuring we implement a fair and humane regulation of new genetic technologies like PGD. The amount of weight we place on protecting reproductive freedom vs equality or some other aim needs to be influenced by the background context of the society in question (e.g. its level of patriarchy, health of its democratic practices, etc.) and by key considerations concerning these new technologies (e.g. their price, how accurate the tests are for screening complex phenotypes, etc.). So we need a *flexible* normative framework, one that incorporates the requirements of provisionality. Again, this makes deliberative democracy an attractive normative framework to invoke.

So where does all of this get us? Should we permit parents to utilize PGD for non-medical purposes like gender selection? Well that’s ultimately up to us as a society (not me) to decide. But, for what it’s worth, here is a brief summary of my two cents worth (the complete paper gives the longer answer).

A second-order analysis of these issues will take us away from thinking in terms of false dichotomies like: “Should X (e.g. gender selection) be permitted or prohibited?”. Taking the prescriptions of deliberative democracy seriously will lead us to measures that seek to *reasonably balance* the diverse stakes that arise in this context. And this will likely lead us to consider less restrictive measures (e.g. perhaps a ban on selection of gender for first child, or a requirement that you already have two children of the same sex, etc.) rather than outright bans on gender selection.

Furthermore, given the lack of empirical evidence concerning the likely societal impact permitting these technologies would have on our society (e.g. impact on equality, gender balance, etc.) we should take a provisional attitude. So what we decide now, concerning what constitutes a proper balance between respect for liberty vs respect for equality, is not the end of the dialogue and debate. We need to revisit these issues as new screening technologies become possible, as the price for PGD falls, and in light of empirical evidence concerning what actually motivates parents to pursue these technologies.

Putting all this together suggests, at least to me, that those who currently propose outright bans on the non-medical uses of PGD like gender selection really face an uphill battle. And that the current prohibition on gender selection, in both the UK and Canada, is not justified. And I think we owe those parents whose reproductive freedom we are infringing a compelling justification for why their liberty is being curtailed. To fail to do so is, I believe, to fail to satisfy the moral requirements of deliberative democracy.

Cheers,
Colin

Theorizing the “Non-Ideal” (Part 1)

As academics we have the luxury of spending significant amounts of time and energy learning about this world, and contributing to the project of creating, and disseminating, knowledge. And with this opportunity comes great responsibility- to use our time, and talents, prudently. This requires us to be critically reflective inquisitors, to ask ourselves what is important to know, and what is important to challenge, and why.

Within my field of research- political philosophy- there is often a general (somewhat ambiguous) divide between what is called “ideal” and “non-ideal” theory. What constitutes this divide is very contentious, with some arguing that the distinction itself lacks precision and muddies the intellectual waters rather than helps things. But I remain convinced that this general distinction is helpful, despite what the naysayers might argue.

Ideal theorists tend to theorize “the ideal” (with perhaps some occasional smatterings of the non-ideal variety thrown in as an afterthought). Plato is perhaps the best example of an ideal theorist. And so this multi-series blog post begins with a discussion, and brief criticism, of ideal theory and Plato.

Plato’s Republic is concerned with the question “What is justice?”. And after rejecting the conceptions championed by his contemporaries (e.g. justice is telling the truth and returning anything borrowed, justice is in the interest of the stronger party, etc.), Plato came up with his own conception of justice- both at the level of the individual (his account of the hierarchy between reason, courage and the appetites) and for society as a whole (his account of the hierarchy between philosophers, soldiers and the masses).

When deriving his account of justice Plato theorized ideals- his “epistocracy” posits philosopher kings and queens, people like Socrates, who pursue, and comprehend, the truth. The allegory of the cave, and the philosopher as possessing the rare intellectual virtues needed to grasp “the forms”, is a great example of this ideal theorizing. As is his assumption of our soul’s immortality, which provides the foundational justification for why justice has intrinsic (as well as extrinsic) value.

Of course Plato does consider some non-ideal considerations along the way- filling in details of why his ideal society is necessary and how it could be viable. For example, Plato believed that democracy was epistemically bankrupt because it gave political power to those skilled at pandering to the masses rather than those who genuinely possessed intellectual virtue. To ensure this elite intellectual class ruled for the “common good” rather than their own private interests, the Guardians would not be permitted to own private property or be distracted by the parental duties of the family. And Plato advocated selective eugenic breeding and emphasized the importance education would play in forming character.

I love Plato’s work, I think Plato’s Republic is among one of the most significant contributions to the history of political thought. But I think we have learned a lot in the past 2.5 thousand years, such that theorists today, in the 21st century, are not justified in doing the arm-chair theorizing Plato engaged in.

Plato could be excused for pontificating from the armchair about our propensity towards intellectual vice and virtue because psychology, for example, had not yet shed light on the various biases and shortcomings and strengths of the human mind. And perhaps Plato could be permitted to fixate solely on the alleged shortcomings of democracy because he lacked the empirical insights needed to make an informed, more comprehensive and comparative analysis of what the virtues and vices are of democratic and non-democratic forms of governance. But today we know much more about human nature and governance than Plato knew living in Ancient Greece. So I do not think we should start with “theorizing the ideal” in the manner Plato does.

A contemporary example of this Platonic form of ideal theorizing is luck egalitarianism (LE), which was/(is?) a prominent position in the field during the 1980s, 1990s and beyond. The “equality of what?” debate was mostly preoccupied with figuring out what the distributive ideal was (e.g. welfare, resources, opportunity for welfare, capabilities, etc.). Inequalities that were chosen were fine, according to LE, but inequalities that arose because of circumstances beyond our control were unjust. Little concern was given to the reality that many inequalities are a complex mix of chosen and unchosen factors, or that some types of inequalities might be more easily redressed than others, etc. The literature on equality was dominated not by analyses explaining how real (income) inequality was created and perpetuated over time. Instead it was dominated by hypothetical stories about shipwrecked survivors engaging in clam auctions and Malibu surfers expecting to be fed without any expectation that they should be willing to work in order to enjoy the benefits of the welfare state.

Defenders of ideal theory often respond to criticisms of it by saying one of two things: (1) that we should “let a thousand flowers bloom” in our discipline and/or (2) non-ideal theory needs ideal theory, for the latter details the objective, and non-ideal details the route to realize that objective. I don’t find either response particularly satisfactory.

With (1) I have no problem with the discipline being diverse in its methodology, with some theorists doing “high theory” while others work on more concrete/applied topics. Ten years ago my complaint would have been that too few people did non-ideal theory compared to ideal theory. Things seem to have shifted somewhat. But I think the dominance of the ideal-theory paradigm has stunted even the development of our non-ideal theorizing. (1) should not be done in a fashion that impairs the development of intellectual virtue- such as an understanding of our history and the current state of the world, or why real injustices occur and persist, or what constitutes large vs small societal problems, etc. So what might strike some of my colleagues as my “intolerant” attitude towards ideal theorizing stems from my conviction that I believe ideal theory impedes what ought to be the raison d’être of the discipline- namely, the creation of emancipatory knowledge.

Political philosophy is the exercise of practical reason. It is in the business of diagnosing practical predicaments that we perhaps underappreciate the significance of, or are blinded to, without the insight of the political philosopher. And it is in the business of offering some practical guidance to help us move from the “here and now” to a more fair and humane future. It is not a discipline for navel gazing, contemplating, as medieval scholastics did, the epistemic characteristics of angels (e.g. do they think more clearly in the morning?).

The reason I do not take the “let a thousand flowers bloom” mentality about the discipline is that I believe, as educators employed at institutions of higher education, we should be in the business of cultivating and refining intellectual virtue. Our undergraduate and graduate students are with us only for a few years, and if the time they spend with us in our courses doesn't help them better understand the predicaments of the world, or to critically evaluate different moral and political aspirations, then we have failed in our job. If our students walk away with bafflement about the bizarre thought experiments constructed by ideal theorists, or walk away with reinforced moral intuitions and convictions without every seriously challenging and defending them, then our pedagogical mission to help cultivate and disseminate emancipatory knowledge has failed.

I think our research and teaching are deeply and intricately related. The latter is not a burden academics must endure in order to get a pay cheque. Like doing research and writing, teaching ought to be something that motivates us to get out of bed each day, to learn something new, to challenge our own intellectual growth and curiosity. We are extremely fortunate to get to interact daily with bright young students who have diverse and interesting perspectives on these issues.

In my next post I plan to write something about one historical figure that I think exemplified “non-ideal” theory in that he theorized the non-ideal- and that figure is Karl Marx. Stay tuned!

Cheers,
Colin

Parental Interventions- Environmental vs Genetic

In my "Genetics and Justice" class today we discussed and debated the issue of parents pursuing environmental vs genetic pursuits to influence the development of different phenotypes in their offspring.

My own position on this issue is best captured in my paper "Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement". But here I want to float a few further thoughts that came out of the class discussion today.

The reality is that parents have, for better or worse, an enormous impact on the life prospects of their children. They have the primary responsibility for raising, nurturing and loving their children.

Before we turn to the issue of parents being able to directly intervene in their offspring through genetic intervention, let's consider how parents can already modify the biology of their children through environmental intervention.

(1) Nutrition. The food a child consumes (fruits, vegetables, fat, protein, etc.) is profoundly influenced by their parents. The groceries parents purchase determines the "menu of options" available to a child for all the meals at home, lunches packed and taken to school, etc. And nutrition has a profound impact on the physical and mental development of a child. It influences their height, weight, health of their bones and brain development. So what we feed our children influences their biological development. It can set them on the path to health and intelligence, or it can set them on the path towards obesity, disease and intellectual challenges.


(2) Physical Activity. Parents influence the amount of physical exercise their children get. Walking vs driving to school. Playing sports, etc. These all impact the physical, mental and behavioural development of children. These activities can aid muscle development, coordination, self-confidence, team work, patience, etc. Conversely, permitting children to live physically inactive lives can seriously compromise their health and welfare.

(3) Cognitive Development. The neighborhood parents decide to live in influences the educational opportunities open to their children in terms of the quality of their schools. So does the time and effort a parent devotes to reading with their children, helping with their homework, being supportive, etc. The decision to have other siblings also impacts the educational environment a child is exposed to at home (e.g. learning to share with a sibling).

(4) Moral/Social development. Parents can also encourage or discourage friendships for their children which influence many aspects of a child's psychological development. Parent's can help instill a work ethic in their children or they can spoil them. They can raise them to respect certain moral codes or ignore their moral education. Parents can expose their children to religious practices that alter the biochemistry of their brain.

OK, so when we look at the full picture of the range of environmental interventions that parents are free to pursue, we see it is a complex, multifaceted story. But what is evident is that these conventional interventions impact the biological development of children. Indeed, the rise of childhood obesity in the past two decades is clear evidence of how (1) and (2) can pose very significant risks to the health of our offspring. Recognising the risks inherent in environmental interventions is important for it dispels any distorted perception we may be inclined to have that environmental interventions are "risk free". They are not. Many parental actions and inactions, while not falling into the realm of "criminally negligible", still harm their children.

Now when to turn to the prospect of a genetic or pharmaceutical intervention that directly influences the biology of a child parents are likely to rule these interventions out of hand as "unnatural" and "too risky". But I think this is jumping the gun. It all depends on the details. What level of risk is appropriate for direct (vs indirect) interventions? And how effective would these interventions be in enhancing valued characteristics (like health and intelligence)? Children already receive vaccinations that enhance their immune system, even though they have some small risk of harm. So we cannot rule direct enhancing interventions out of hand without more details.

In other words, I think the jury is still out on what may prove to the most effective strategies for parents to pursue to create the conditions for their children to flourish. To date we have subjected our children to the massive social experiment know as "the family", where the biological parents you are born to typically have an enormous amount of discretionary power in terms of pursuing environmental interventions that will influence your identify and biology. And so at this stage we have incomplete data concerning the pros and cons of permitting parents to have this power, and what the pros and cons might be if we had safe and effective genetic interventions.

And finally, we need to critically reflect on what the benchmark for "success" is with respect to parental interventions. What do parents owe the children they have brought into existence? Do they owe them just the minimal requirements dictated by the law (e.g. a life free of abuse and neglect)? Or do we owe them more? And if so, what can best help us provide this for them- environmental or genetic interventions (or both)?

I think we should keep an open mind about this. It's easy for parents to overestimate their ability to give their children "the best". I myself would not rule out any intervention that was demonstrated to be a safe and effective way to develop valued phenotypes in children. The grand social experiment of "the family" has its pros and its cons. And the merits of a genetic intervention should be measured by and against those same standards.

Cheers,
Colin

Genetics and Ethics Book (... in the final stretch!)

I am working on the final chapter of my forthcoming textbook titled Genetics and Ethics for Polity Press. It is expected to be published in 2018 and I have cleared my summer schedule to ensure I have time to make the final revisions to make this book so it will be as up-to-date and relevant as possible. Here is the substantive blurb I sent the publishers which gives you an overview of the topics covered and conclusions reached in the book:

Advances in the biomedical sciences, especially our understanding of the role genes play in health, disease, happiness and human behaviour, might help societies advance important moral aspirations. These aspirations range from preventing and treating specific diseases, to realizing greater equality of opportunity, expanding the scope of reproductive freedom and the promotion of the healthy aging of a population. New technological advancements, like genetic screening and testing, gene therapy and genome editing raise a host of ethical questions. Is the idea of “genetically engineering” humans a morally objectionable form of “eugenics”? Would it be ethical to alter the rate of human aging if doing so would increase the number of years humans can expect to live on a warming planet with a global population already exceeding 7 billion people? Should parents undergoing IVF be permitted to screen for the sex of their offspring? What plays a more important role in human health and happiness, heredity or environment? And how does the answer to latter question influence what we consider morally sound science policy to be in the twenty-first century? These and other pressing societal concerns are addressed in Genetics and Ethics.

The book is designed to help students and scholars in the humanities and life sciences think rationally and cogently about the ethical and social challenges raised by the genetic revolution. Some philosophers have urged caution about expanding the domain of human control to include directly influencing the “genetic lottery of life”. Michael Sandel, for example, has argued that the quest to perfect our biology threatens to erode our appreciation for life as a gift. While Jürgen Habermas has defended the position that parents selecting the genetic constitutions of their offspring threaten the self-understanding of the affected person as an autonomous and responsible agent. Other authors make the idea of “normal species functioning” a central focus of their normative analysis of the demands of genetics and justice. In From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler conclude that there is a principled presumption that genetic intervention to prevent or ameliorate serious limitations on opportunity due to disease is a requirement of justice. And finally the bioethicist Julian Savulescu has gone so far as to endorse what he calls the “principle of procreative beneficence” which maintains that couples should select the child who is expected to have the best life based on the relevant information, including genetic information.

Farrelly proposes we pause and hit the “reset” button on the ethical debates about genetics and genetic engineering. The ethical analysis developed in this textbook is not deferential to “normal species functioning” or the therapy/enhancement distinction. Nor does it address the ethics of procreative decisions in a fashion that ignores the different burdens that may be placed on women vs men. And finally, the ethical analysis advanced in the book does not treat genetic interventions as one monolithic type of intervention. Like different types of social engineering (e.g. patriarchy, capitalism, democracy, education, etc.), genetic engineering could be both good or bad. The devil is really in the details. So rather than develop an ethical analysis of genetics that prioritizes one particular value or moral ideal to guide our deliberations about the prospect of genetically engineering humans, Farrelly advances instead a provisional moral analysis. He contends that public discourse and debate should be informed by important empirical insights concerning the role heredity plays in different traits, as well as the risks, benefits and costs of genetic intervention to individuals and societies vs the risks, benefits and costs of the “biological status quo” yielded by the blind process of evolution by natural selection.

The chapters of the book address issues as varied as eugenics, infectious and chronic disease, evolutionary biology, epigenetics, happiness, reproductive freedom and longevity. The book emphasizes why the virtue ethics tradition is particularly helpful to address the complexity of ethical and social issues raised by advances in our understanding of human genetics. The virtuous polity, argues Farrelly, is one that aspires to ensure that both individuals and populations can flourish. By integrating an account of the moral virtues of benevolence and justice with the epistemic or intellectual virtues- the ability to recognise the salient facts and have a sensitivity to details, intellectual humility, adaptability of intellect and the detective’s virtues- Farrelly helps illuminate some of the ethical challenges raised by the genetic revolution. This distinctive methodology of the book, coupled with the timeliness of its applied focus, should appeal to both philosophers and those interested in advances in the biomedical sciences more generally.

An empirically-informed virtue ethics analysis of genetics and ethics, concludes Farrelly, yields five general, substantive moral convictions. Firstly, a virtuous polity would see genetic intervention, whether it be gene therapy, genome editing or a drug that modulates the expression of specific genes, as a possible extension of the duty to aid provided such interventions prove to be reasonably safe and cost-effective ways of preventing or treating morbidity. Secondly, virtuous agents would avoid the folly of both genetic determinism and environmental determinism. Thirdly, a virtuous polity would not necessarily eschew eugenics, where that term is taken to mean, as Bertrand Russell (1934) defines it, as “the attempt to improve the biological character of a breed by deliberate methods adopted to that end”. Eugenic aspirations can be morally defensible, even morally obligatory, when they pursue empirically sound and morally justified aims (e.g. promotion of health) through reasonable and morally justified means that treat all persons as free and equal moral agents. Fourthly, a virtuous polity would take a purposeful approach to determining the scope and limitations of reproductive and parental freedom. Such an approach will give due consideration to three different moral values (without ascribing a primacy to any one of these values)- autonomy, wellbeing and equality. And finally, a virtuous polity would aspire to promote the healthy aging of its population, including pursuing interventions that retard the aging process if doing so increases the healthspan or “biological warranty period” of humans. Any such aging intervention should be pursued in a responsible manner so that considerations of equity, population size, intergenerational justice and environmental impact are also taken seriously.

Reading Group on Stoicism (Post #5)

 Epictetus The Discourses (Book II)

Epictetus Book II

Here is a summary of book II of Epictetus’s Discourses (book I summary is here).  The chapter titles are as follows:

Chapter 1 That confidence is not inconsistent with caution

Chapter 2 Of Tranquillity

Chapter 3  To those who recommend persons to philosophers

Chapter 4  Against a person who had once been detected in adultery

Chapter 5 How magnanimity is consistent with care

Chapter 6  Of indifference

Chapter 7 How we ought to use divination

Chapter 8 What is the nature of the good

Chapter 9  That when we cannot fulfill that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher

Chapter 10  How we may discover the duties of life from names

Chapter 11  What the beginning of philosophy is

Chapter 12  Of disputation or discussion

Chapter 13  On anxiety

Chapter 14 To Naso

Chapter 15 To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined

 

Book II begins with what I see as one of the distinctive strengths of stoicism as form of virtue epistemology- it’s nuance and dept of insight.  It is common for us to see the moral landscape through simple dichotomies- that certain beliefs, dispositions or actions are either good or bad.  EP addresses the issue of confidence and caution, which might appear as contradictory dispositions/attitudes, but he maintains they are not.  The alleged paradox can be resolved by having caution and care about things within our control, and confidence in the things beyond our control as they cannot really harm us. 

For EP, the “bad consists in a bad exercise of the will” and thus “caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will”.  He makes an analogy with deer being hunted and fleeing hunter’s arrows only to run into their nets:

We are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the huntsmen's feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which are independent of the will. In what cases, on the contrary, do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In things dependent on the will. 

EP then applies this insight to death itself.  He claims “Confidence then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. “  We will all die, that is a certainty and cannot be changed.  Thus we should not fret about death itself.  But what we should be concerned about is our fear of death.  This is a product of our “will”.  We do not need to have so much anxiety around the fear of death.  If we come to accept that death is a certainty, and thus a question of “when?” vs “if?”, we can adopt the more helpful mindset of living now and making the most of the opportunities we still have for today. 

This issue raises one I have brought to the fore before with respect to how advances in public health and medicine complicate the stoic’s attitude about death.  Of course death is inevitable.  But we can influence the risks of both disease and death.  During the time of EP our ability to reduce these risks were much more constrained, hence why life expectancy did not exceed age 30.  But we have more than doubled that life expectancy, thanks in part to having caution about specific causes of death- like drinking contaminated water, being exposed to infectious viruses, traffic fatalities, the adverse health consequences of smoking, obesity, diet and physical activity.  Perhaps there can be a 21st century reformulation of EP’s insight here, that some reasonable degree of caution with respect to our physical and mental health should be pursued, but at the same time an acceptance that, inevitably, even our best efforts will not stop (by merely delay) the onset of disease, frailty and, eventually death. 

Chapter 4 has some interesting reflections on infidelity.  EP claims that man is formed for fidelity, and that someone who commits adultery sacrifices not only modesty and sanctity, but the overthrowing of “neighbourhood, and friendship and the community”.  This strikes me as anachronistic and a function of the hierarchal tenets of the original versions of stoicism.  In this period I assume relationships were more about duty than romantic love, and thus a violation of this duty was seen as an afront to the moral fabric of society as a whole.  A more compassionate and nuanced perspective is provided in this book- which details the 17 different reasons people have affairs:

See-if affair

Ejector-seat affair

Heating-up your marriage affair

Distraction affair

Breakout-into-self affair

I just need to indulge myself affair

Let’s-kill-this-relationship-and-see-if-if-it-comes-back-to-life-affair

Unmet needs affair

Having-experiences-I-missed-out-on affair

Do I still have it? Affair

Surrogate-therapy affair

Trading-up affair

Accidental affair

Revenge affair

Mid-life crisis affair

Sexual-panic affair

Midmarriage-crisis affair

The motivations, moral character, and potential adverse societal impact of these different reasons for infidelity can vary quite considerably (some might have a more lasting impact on the animosity among parents after divorcing, making co-parentnig more challenging).  So I would reject the quick and sweeping generalizations EP makes in book II chapter 4, though I suspect norms and expectations around familial duties and spousal roles have changed significantly since the time of EP. 

I was really intrigued by EP’s chapter 10 titled “How we may discover the duties of life from names”.  Here EP notes we have many identities which are bound up in our different names.  I am a man, a father, a brother, an uncle, a colleague and a citizen (and in the past I use also be a son, grandson and husband). 

EP remarks:

… you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient, but one of the principal parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the connection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire anything, otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would cooperate toward his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the part and the state to the citizen. But now, because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we were made among other things for this.

Sometimes the duties and obligations of our identities conflict.  Work commitments, for example, may conflict with parental duties.  Either you are a diligent worker and feel like a negligent parent, or vice versa.  Or the duties as a citizen or human being might require sacrifices that conflict with familial duties are some reasonable degree of self-regarding concern.  To function as a feasible and reasonable personal ethic I think stoicism must offer some insightful advice on how to reasonably balance the different moral demands that are placed upon us.  But I did not see how EP could help us navigate through these issues. 

In Chapter 11 EP asserts that intellectual humility is the first act of philosophy- “The beginning of philosophy to him at least who enters on it in the right way and by the door, is a consciousness of his own weakness and inability about necessary things.”  It might be a useful group exercise for everyone to reflect on humility as a personal epistemic virtue.  Over time have you become more or less humble, as you have acquired more life experience.  Is there a specific belief that you have changed your mind on?  Something that the younger you had some very strong convictions about but now you hold an opposing or more nuanced view.  Think of an example you would be comfortable sharing with the group.

EP continues by highlighting the causes of disagreement, he remarks:  “Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement”.  Think of some significant social issue that people disagree about, it might be something pertaining to climate change, or vaccination passports, or fiscal or immigration policies.  Think of your position on this issue.  And then try, in the most compassionate and authentic fashion, to articulate the strongest opposing argument to your own convictions.  This “playing the devil’s advocate” role and keeping an open mind about considering different premises- empirical and normative- or weighing concerns (risks/benefits) differently is the “nuts and bolts” of real policy disagreement.  Sadly in popular debates and the media disagreement is often portrayed as between “the experts vs the idiots”, but this framing seldom leads to any genuine understanding of opposing perspectives, and with it a reasonable compromise.

Chapter 13 covers a very topical issue given the pandemic- the prevalence of anxiety. 

“When I see a man anxious, I say, "What does this man want? If he did not want something which is not in his power, how could he be anxious?" For this reason a lute player when he is singing by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the theatre, he is anxious even if he has a good voice and plays well on the lute; for he not only wishes to sing well, but also to obtain applause: but this is not in his power. 

Let’s take some time to unpack anxiety.  Some degree of anxiety can be healthy and productive, helping us to perform better and focus.  For example, the anxiety a student might feel before an exam or a single person before a first date.  But taken too far, anxiety can be a destructive force, leading a person to ruminate endlessly in their head about something they cannot control (e.g. “will my date like me?”) and avoiding the actions needed to lean into, and work through, their anxiety (e.g. cancelling the date at the last minute vs risking rejection). 

EP notes how confidence is the antidote to anxiety.  He gives the example of a musician. If someone lacks musical skills they would be anxious about performing for others.  But to someone who has practiced and is competent as a musician, they will not be anxious.  Carrying that example over to the dating example, a person who is truly happy and accepting of who they are (i.e. their sense of self-esteem is not contingent upon a stranger liking them), and has some experience dating will not have anxiety about going on a first date.  They know that no one “rejects them’, but rather they just might not be the right match.  And that’s ok, you date people to find the right match (something that cannot be achieved without experiencing some mismatches).  The bottom line- action (and the experience and competence that comes with it) is the way to redress anxiety. 

Summarizing then a few of the topics that might be interesting for the group to focus on from Book 2 include:

1.      EP’s resolution of the so-called “paradox” of caution/confidence (and how that applies to death).

2. What different moral duties and obligations arise from your “different identities” (e.g. partner, parent, co-worker, citizen, human being) and how do you manage potential conflicts between these duties/obligations when they arise?

3.       humility- as you gain more life experience and insight have you become more or less humble?  What core conviction/belief have you changed your mind on?

4. Disagreement exercise:  think of some societal predicament there is strong disagreement about, and try to think of the most compelling counter-points to the position you take.

 5. Reflect on the prevalence of anxiety in society today.  How can we, both personally and in our culture more generally, reduce the burden and toll anxiety inflicts on so many people?  Do you think stoicism can be of real help for this problem?   

Should be a stimulating discussion!

Cheers,

Colin