Saturday, November 27, 2021

Framing an Aging Intervention (reflections 1)


For the past 15 years I have devoted a significant amount of my research to exploring the issue of how to frame, and morally assess, the social significance of an applied gerontological intervention.  

This topic is well off the beaten track from mainstream moral and political philosophy.  At the current moment you won't find the topic of aging, let alone anything informed by the biology of aging or the prospect of altering aging, among the current trends or central debates in mainstream bioethics or political philosophy.  But for me the prospect of altering aging is one of the most intriguing, significant and timely issues to address.  Two major developments this century warrant this focus-  (1) the aging of human populations (there will be over 2 billion persons age 60+ by the year 2050) and (2) the rapid pace of scientific innovation in the biomedical sciences, especially with respect to slowing the aging process.  Neither of these developments are featured in the evening news, or Twitter academic debates, which perpetuates their neglect.  But if you follow the scientific fields related to these issues you can appreciate how significant these developments are.  With sparse interlocutors from the humanities and social sciences to draw upon in my research, I have found the most formative sources and influences have come from interdisciplinary studies on aging, evolutionary biology and demography.  

There are many ways to "frame" the prospect of altering human aging.  For me the wrong questions to ask are:  "Would you want to live to 120+ years of age?" or "Would you like to be immortal?".  Even asking "Should we alter human aging?" is unhelpful as it is ambiguous what this really means (this will be the focus of post 2). 

I believe the correct question to ask is this:  "Should we reduce the risks of disease, frailty and disability in late life?"  And the answer is clearly "Yes, of course we should!".  This is what justifies every other public health measure, like vaccines, smoking cessation, exercise and a healthy diet.  

But even this obvious "Yes!" response will be subject to a barrage of knee-jerk objections and concerns:  "What if these health benefits are not immediately equally realized by everyone in the world?"  Or,  "How does this help us tackle climate change or overpopulation?"  Or "How can you talk about improving health in late life when there are young children who die prematurely?"  There are many distinct things going on in such responses.  Sometimes it is simple moral myopia, other times blatant ageism, and other times simplistic sequential reasoning (e.g. we can only do thing at a time, like either chew gum or walk, but not both!).

It is striking and surprising that such concerns are never raised as an objection to trying to cure cancer, or promoting smoking cessation or exercise.  Perhaps there are some who think that, because curing cancer would not solve climate change (but could actually exacerbate things) or  most early life mortality that we should simply tolerate 10 million annual cancer deaths per year (in the the hopes of preventing  250K deaths from climate change in 20 years time).     

There is something about the prospect of altering aging itself that triggers a range of negative emotive responses.  In my research I try to engage with these concerns and objections in a rational and cogent fashion.  A conclusion I have recently come to on this subject is that people's concerns and objections to slowing aging are not typically predicated upon empirically valid and morally sound judgments (what could justify forfeiting public health measures which help prevent disease, frailty, disability and death?).  Instead people often invoke different "sacred values", values they think should not be violated (e.g. equality) or traded off against (e.g. the environment).  And yet if any value was to be considered "sacred" you would think it is health itself.  But if you frame altering aging in the wrong way (e.g. by implying it is immortality) you activate this sacred value mindset.  And the quality of discussion and debate is derailed.   

Most critics of longevity science seem to have an innate conservative bias in favour of the current rate of molecular and cellular decline, as if evolution by natural selection (or some "Gaian-like" hypothesis) had preordained senescence (and its accompanying disease, frailty and disability) as part of the "natural order" of things and any suggestion of altering that rate of aging would erode this fragility and lead to some catastrophic outcome.   Rather than risk this deleterious societal outcome, these critics seem to think we should instead happily accept the current chronic disease burden, extensive caring burdens, and economic burdens of population aging with grace and acceptance. 

In my next post on this topic I will expand a bit on how to frame an aging intervention so that more rational and cogent discussions concerning the responsible use of such technologies can be had.

Cheers, 

Colin


 


Thursday, November 25, 2021

Reading Group on Stoicism (Post #6)

 


Epictetus The Discourses (Books III and IV)

This is my last blog entry for the Stoicism reading group, completing Epictetus’s Discourses, Books III and IV (Book I notes here, Book II notes here).  The end of the teaching semester has me pressed for time so my notes and reflections are briefer than I would have liked.  The last two Books are pretty dense, and I just didn’t have the time to devote to a more expansive and detailed engagement on the final two Books.  What follows is a few of the things that stood out to me as topics worth discussing as a group, along with a few critical reflections I have on EP’s central normative prescriptions.

Chapter 1 of Book III begins with EP noting what he thinks we should not care about- our clothes and appearance-, though he seems to have different (gendered) views about this for men and women. 

You possess the rational faculty as a peculiar thing: adorn and beautify this; but leave your hair to him who made it as he chose. Come, what other appellations have you? Are you man or woman? "Man." Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman. Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and if she has much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous not to have hair; and if he has no hair, he is a monster; but if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what name shall we show him? "I will exhibit to you a man who chooses to be a woman rather than a man." What a terrible sight! There is no man who will not wonder at such a notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man what fault have you to find with your nature? That it made you a man? What then? was it fit that nature should make all human creatures women? and what advantage in that case would you have had in being adorned? for whom would you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were women? ….

In Chapter 2 he then turns to what we should care about.

Chapter 2:  three things in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good.   

(1) concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not desire.

(2) second concerns the movements (toward) and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not carelessly.

(3) The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgement, and generally it concerns the assents.

When it comes to our desires and aversions, perhaps the group could reflect on the top things they desire and have an aversion to.  Have you learned any valuable lessons about succeeding in having your desires satisfied or avoiding your aversions?  What works and what doesn’t work?

Chapter 3 is concerned with the business of the wise.  EP remarks:

The material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty: and the body is the material for the physician and the aliptes; the land is the matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature to be moved toward the desire of the good, and to aversion from the evil; and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent.

In Chapter 8 EP suggests how the Stoic mindset could immunize us from painful thoughts.  This point is perhaps my most significant disagreement I have with EP’s philosophy of stoicism.  He remarks:

As we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, so we ought to exercise ourselves daily against appearances; for these appearances also propose questions to us. "A certain person son is dead." Answer: the thing is not within the power of the will: it is not an evil. "A father has disinherited a certain son. What do you think of it?" It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil. "Caesar has condemned a person." It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil. "The man is afflicted at this." Affliction is a thing which depends on the will: it is an evil. He has borne the condemnation bravely." That is a thing within the power of the will: it is a good. If we train ourselves in this manner, we shall make progress; for we shall never assent to anything of which there is not an appearance capable of being comprehended. Your son is dead. What has happened? Your son is dead. Nothing more? Nothing. Your ship is lost. What has happened? Your ship is lost. A man has been led to prison. What has happened? He has been led to prison. But that herein he has fared badly, every man adds from his own opinion. "But Zeus," you say, "does not do right in these matters." Why? because he has made you capable of endurance? because he has made you magnanimous? because he has taken from that which befalls you the power of being evil? because it is in your power to be happy while you are suffering what you suffer; because he has opened the door to you, when things do not please you? Man, go out and do not complain.

            Suppose, for example, a father who finds himself in the situation EP describes, he receives news that his son is dead, killed in an automobile accident.  His response “That is not within my control!  Therefore it is not evil”.  Perhaps EP’s stance on this is responding to theological rationalizations of such tragic events; to the parent who causes themselves unnecessary anguish by asking “Why would god do this to me (or to my son)?”  That I can agree with.  Such tragic events are part of life, there is not some divine plan or intention behind them.  But I think EP’s Stoic mantra of “things outside of our power do not disturb us” is neither possible nor desirable/healthy.  EP is basically encouraging avoidance and compartmentalization.  Yes this may (in the short-term) help someone avoid unpleasant emotions like grief, but I do not think this is a healthy mindset to aspire to adopt.  This may be a rational and even adaptive mindset to appropriate if one had endured the emotional pain and misery of slavery (as EP did).  But I do not think it is an appropriate mindset to adapt for people today. 

His stance on this issue is most stark in the concluding chapter (18) of book III titled “That we ought not to be disturbed by any news”, where he says “When anything shall be reported to you which is of a nature to disturb, have this principle in readiness, that the news is about nothing which is within the power.”   For me, bad news is still bad news, regardless of it being within my power.  By definition “bad news” concerns events that have already transpired, and thus they necessarily are “beyond my current ability to control”.   But that does not diminish the appropriateness and importance of responding with grief and disappointment.  Obviously a persistent state of misery and suffering ruminating about bad in the world is not healthy.  But between EP’s emotional avoidance and an excessively ruminating mindset lays what I think is the healthy route of emotional healing from loss.  And the healing process involves more than simply saying “Not within my control? Then not worth expelling emotional energy on!” 

Chapter 12 deals with exercise, and again I found myself disagreeing with EP on this issue:

We ought not to make our exercises consist in means contrary to nature and adapted to cause admiration, for, if we do so, we, who call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ at all from jugglers. For it is difficult even to walk on a rope; and not only difficult, but it is also dangerous. Ought we for this reason to practice walking on a rope, or setting up a palm tree, or embracing statues? By no means. Everything, which is difficult and dangerous is not suitable for practice; but that is suitable which conduces to the working out of that which is proposed to us as a thing to be worked out. To live with desire and aversion, free from restraint. And what is this? Neither to be disappointed in that which you desire, nor to fall into anything which you would avoid. Toward this object, then, exercise ought to tend.

My source of disagreement is that I think some dangerous and difficult exercise (dangerous and difficult up to a point!) is consistent with nature.  From an evolutionary perspective such behaviours and actions help with the development of many skills that helped confer improve the survival of individuals and communities.  So I think we need jugglers, as well as philosophers, but we also need some juggling philosophers!   

In Chapter 16 EP addresses the issue of who we socialize with.  I agree with the point that who one spends most of their time with will influence their behaviour and mental energy, etc. and thus we should be selective to some degree.  But EP’s comments struck me as elitist and misguided in the priority it places on being embedded in an “uber-philosophical” environment.

If a man has frequent intercourse with others, either for talk, or drinking together, or generally for social purposes, he must either become like them, or change them to his own fashion. For if a man places a piece of quenched charcoal close to a piece that is burning, either the quenched charcoal will quench the other, or the burning charcoal will light that which is quenched. Since, then, the danger is so great, we must cautiously enter into such intimacies with those of the common sort, and remember that it is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is covered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself. For what will you do if a man speaks about gladiators, about horses, about athletes, or, what is worse, about men? "Such a person is bad," "Such a person is good": "This was well done," "This was done badly." Further, if he scoff, or ridicule, or show an ill-natured disposition? Is any man among us prepared like a lute-player when he takes a lute, so that as soon as he has touched the strings, he discovers which are discordant, and tunes the instrument? such a power as Socrates had who in all his social intercourse could lead his companions to his own purpose? How should you have this power? It is therefore a necessary consequence that you are carried about by the common kind of people.

Book 4 turns to a very important issue in political philosophy- freedom.  There is plenty that could be said on this topic (is freedom “freedom from interference” (negative liberty) or “self-determination” (positive freedom)), but unfortunately I do not have the time to needed to devote a more serious engagement with EP’s views on this topic.  I will complete this post by simply noting his opening comments on freedom:

He is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid. Who, then, chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he, then, free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any bad man free.

Some topics to consider for our final group discussion on EP include:

1.      When it comes to your own desires and aversions, have you learned any valuable lessons about succeeding in having your desires satisfied, or avoiding your aversions?  What works and what doesn’t work?

2.      What are your thoughts on the following principle of EP?: “When anything shall be reported to you which is of a nature to disturb, have this principle in readiness, that the news is about nothing which is within the power.”

3.      What is freedom?  Do you consider yourself free?  Is our society actually a “free society”?  What are the biggest threats to human freedom in the 21st century?

Cheers,

Colin

 


Sunday, November 21, 2021

PNAS Opinion Piece on Global Governance of Genome Editing




The latest issue of PNAS has this interesting opinion piece on the global governance of genome editing.  The recommendations include encouraging prominent journals and conferences to help facilitate dialogue on these issues, ensuring more scientists from developing countries are involved and historically neglected regions and countries, as well as collaboration between private and public funding agencies in science and medicine.  

I myself remain somewhat skeptical that the sound policy regulation of these technologies simply requires more global participation in these debates.  Yes these measures would, as the title of the article ("Toward Inclusive Global Governance of Human Genome Editing") suggests, make the governance of genome editing more inclusive.  But I think the goal to should be competent governance (i.e. socially responsibly governance, to realize the opportunities of genome editing and minimize any potential harms) vs "inclusive" governance.  I agree that competent governance does entail a certain level of inclusiveness from different stake holders, but the thrust of this opinion piece seems to equate an "inclusive regulation" with a "morally defensible and socially responsible" regulation of genome editing.  I believe greater inclusivity is a necessary, but not sufficient, requirement of sound governance of genome editing.  And if taken too far, it can be an epistemic vice or constraint vs virtue.        

A sample from the article:  

In recent years, many have considered how best to govern increasingly powerful genome editing technologies. Since 2015, more than 60 statements, declarations, and other codes of practice have been published by international organizations and scientific institutions (1). In particular, the 2018 birth of two twins, Lulu and Nana—whose HIV-receptors CCR5 were altered by biophysics researcher He Jiankui—triggered widespread condemnation from the scientific community, the public, and even legal institutions. Eminent organizations that have opined on the matter include the World Health Organization’s Expert Advisory Committee on Developing Global Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Editing (WHO committee) and the International Commission on the Clinical Use of Human Germline Genome Editing (the international commission).

....Science is evolving at a feverish pace. Technological development is no longer the purview of a few leading academic institutes and a handful of entrepreneurial forerunners, as illustrated with the rise of CRISPR-based technologies driving the democratization of genome editing. Accordingly, governance by the few for all is no longer appropriate nor acceptable. Each approach suggested above has seen some historical success and has potential to improve governance of human genome editing. We must combine these tools into an integrated network. Standards and agreements independently launched by academic journals, funding agencies, and international professional organizations could mutually reinforce each other. Key individuals and organizations could play the critical role as the bridges connecting different approaches. The global governance of human genome editing urgently needs the wisdom of the entire global scientific community as well as those in related fields and interested members of the general public.

Cheers, 

Colin

Tuesday, November 16, 2021

Obesity Increases During Lockdowns


UK report on the data of obesity increases in children during the pandemic. A truly devastating impact. Tragically we can expect to see data like this from many regions of the world.

Summary: In children ages 4-5 years obesity rose from 9.9% in 2019/20 to 14.4% in 2020/21. And for children ages 10-11 the rise went from 21% up to 25.5%. Those living in the poorest areas were more than twice as likely to be obese.

Cheers,
Colin

Friday, November 12, 2021

Updated Summary of Research

 

As part of a forthcoming departmental media activity, I have had to put together some concise ideas about my research.  I went through a few different edits to shorten my comments, but thought I would detail the “longer version” here on my blog.

There are many topics I have published on in the past 20 years, including ideal theory, population aging, cancer, COVID-19, virtue epistemology, Marx and patriarchy, toleration, genetics, reproductive freedom, play, positive biology, well-ordered science, equality, framing aging, gene patents, deliberative democracy, etc.  Despite what might appear as quite disparate topics and interests, there actually is a unifying concern behind most of these projects.

Below I try to summarize (in less than 500 words) the central concern of my intellectual life, in response to three questions: 

What are you researching?

We are living in the midst of a fascinating, and rapidly progressing, “genetic revolution”.  My research examines the ethical and social implications of this revolution.  This revolution has both an epistemic and a technological dimension.  The epistemic dimension is the new knowledge we are leaning about the role genes and heredity play in health, cognition, happiness and behaviour.  These new findings  compel social scientists to revisit the so-called “nature/nurture” debate, and address it from an empirically informed perspective vs the armchair theorizing perspective we have tended to function within. 

And there is also a technological dimension to the genetic revolution.  For the first time in human history we are developing the capacity to purposefully and directly alter our biology via gene therapy and genome editing, to improve upon what evolution by natural selection has given us.  Should the goal biomedical research be limited to treating specific diseases?  Or should we also aspire to “enhance” our biology so that we can enjoy more health in late life, improve cognition and our potential for happiness, and maybe alter human nature itself?  These are the central questions that preoccupy my attention.

What do you hope your research will achieve?

The goal of my research is to redress a concern raised over half a century ago by the British novelist and scientist CP Snow in his famous lecture “The Two Cultures”.  Snow argued that there was a gulf between science and the humanities, and this gulf still persists today.  To ensure we implement “well-ordered” science in the 21st century I believe interdisciplinary dialogue and debate is needed so that we have rational and cogent deliberations about the regulation of these scientific innovations.  In my research I try to integrate empirical findings from demography, biogerontology and evolutionary biology with normative insights from bioethics and political theory.  By doing so I hope to help harrow the divide between the natural sciences and the humanities/social sciences.

What excites you must about your research?

The fast pace of scientific discovery, and uncertainty about where the science might go in the future, really excites my intellectual curiosity.  What was considered science fiction only 10-20 years ago is now a reality.  We need to develop the “intellectual flexibility” necessary to refine and modify our normative theories and public policy decision-making to take seriously the changing moral landscape of the 21st century and population aging.  I find such a project both challenging and fascinating.

Cheers, 

Colin

 


Thursday, November 11, 2021

Reading Group on Stoicism (Post #5)

 Epictetus The Discourses (Book II)


Epictetus Book II

Here is a summary of book II of Epictetus’s Discourses (book I summary is here).  The chapter titles are as follows:


Chapter 1 That confidence is not inconsistent with caution

Chapter 2 Of Tranquillity

Chapter 3  To those who recommend persons to philosophers

Chapter 4  Against a person who had once been detected in adultery

Chapter 5 How magnanimity is consistent with care

Chapter 6  Of indifference

Chapter 7 How we ought to use divination

Chapter 8 What is the nature of the good

Chapter 9  That when we cannot fulfill that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher

Chapter 10  How we may discover the duties of life from names

Chapter 11  What the beginning of philosophy is

Chapter 12  Of disputation or discussion

Chapter 13  On anxiety

Chapter 14 To Naso

Chapter 15 To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have determined

 

Book II begins with what I see as one of the distinctive strengths of stoicism as form of virtue epistemology- it’s nuance and dept of insight.  It is common for us to see the moral landscape through simple dichotomies- that certain beliefs, dispositions or actions are either good or bad.  EP addresses the issue of confidence and caution, which might appear as contradictory dispositions/attitudes, but he maintains they are not.  The alleged paradox can be resolved by having caution and care about things within our control, and confidence in the things beyond our control as they cannot really harm us. 

For EP, the “bad consists in a bad exercise of the will” and thus “caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will”.  He makes an analogy with deer being hunted and fleeing hunter’s arrows only to run into their nets:

We are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the huntsmen's feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which are independent of the will. In what cases, on the contrary, do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In things dependent on the will. 

EP then applies this insight to death itself.  He claims “Confidence then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. “  We will all die, that is a certainty and cannot be changed.  Thus we should not fret about death itself.  But what we should be concerned about is our fear of death.  This is a product of our “will”.  We do not need to have so much anxiety around the fear of death.  If we come to accept that death is a certainty, and thus a question of “when?” vs “if?”, we can adopt the more helpful mindset of living now and making the most of the opportunities we still have for today. 

This issue raises one I have brought to the fore before with respect to how advances in public health and medicine complicate the stoic’s attitude about death.  Of course death is inevitable.  But we can influence the risks of both disease and death.  During the time of EP our ability to reduce these risks were much more constrained, hence why life expectancy did not exceed age 30.  But we have more than doubled that life expectancy, thanks in part to having caution about specific causes of death- like drinking contaminated water, being exposed to infectious viruses, traffic fatalities, the adverse health consequences of smoking, obesity, diet and physical activity.  Perhaps there can be a 21st century reformulation of EP’s insight here, that some reasonable degree of caution with respect to our physical and mental health should be pursued, but at the same time an acceptance that, inevitably, even our best efforts will not stop (by merely delay) the onset of disease, frailty and, eventually death. 

Chapter 4 has some interesting reflections on infidelity.  EP claims that man is formed for fidelity, and that someone who commits adultery sacrifices not only modesty and sanctity, but the overthrowing of “neighbourhood, and friendship and the community”.  This strikes me as anachronistic and a function of the hierarchal tenets of the original versions of stoicism.  In this period I assume relationships were more about duty than romantic love, and thus a violation of this duty was seen as an afront to the moral fabric of society as a whole.  A more compassionate and nuanced perspective is provided in this book- which details the 17 different reasons people have affairs:

See-if affair

Ejector-seat affair

Heating-up your marriage affair

Distraction affair

Breakout-into-self affair

I just need to indulge myself affair

Let’s-kill-this-relationship-and-see-if-if-it-comes-back-to-life-affair

Unmet needs affair

Having-experiences-I-missed-out-on affair

Do I still have it? Affair

Surrogate-therapy affair

Trading-up affair

Accidental affair

Revenge affair

Mid-life crisis affair

Sexual-panic affair

Midmarriage-crisis affair

The motivations, moral character, and potential adverse societal impact of these different reasons for infidelity can vary quite considerably (some might have a more lasting impact on the animosity among parents after divorcing, making co-parentnig more challenging).  So I would reject the quick and sweeping generalizations EP makes in book II chapter 4, though I suspect norms and expectations around familial duties and spousal roles have changed significantly since the time of EP. 

I was really intrigued by EP’s chapter 10 titled “How we may discover the duties of life from names”.  Here EP notes we have many identities which are bound up in our different names.  I am a man, a father, a brother, an uncle, a colleague and a citizen (and in the past I use also be a son, grandson and husband). 

EP remarks:

… you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient, but one of the principal parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the connection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire anything, otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would cooperate toward his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the part and the state to the citizen. But now, because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we were made among other things for this.

Sometimes the duties and obligations of our identities conflict.  Work commitments, for example, may conflict with parental duties.  Either you are a diligent worker and feel like a negligent parent, or vice versa.  Or the duties as a citizen or human being might require sacrifices that conflict with familial duties are some reasonable degree of self-regarding concern.  To function as a feasible and reasonable personal ethic I think stoicism must offer some insightful advice on how to reasonably balance the different moral demands that are placed upon us.  But I did not see how EP could help us navigate through these issues. 

In Chapter 11 EP asserts that intellectual humility is the first act of philosophy- “The beginning of philosophy to him at least who enters on it in the right way and by the door, is a consciousness of his own weakness and inability about necessary things.”  It might be a useful group exercise for everyone to reflect on humility as a personal epistemic virtue.  Over time have you become more or less humble, as you have acquired more life experience.  Is there a specific belief that you have changed your mind on?  Something that the younger you had some very strong convictions about but now you hold an opposing or more nuanced view.  Think of an example you would be comfortable sharing with the group.

EP continues by highlighting the causes of disagreement, he remarks:  “Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement”.  Think of some significant social issue that people disagree about, it might be something pertaining to climate change, or vaccination passports, or fiscal or immigration policies.  Think of your position on this issue.  And then try, in the most compassionate and authentic fashion, to articulate the strongest opposing argument to your own convictions.  This “playing the devil’s advocate” role and keeping an open mind about considering different premises- empirical and normative- or weighing concerns (risks/benefits) differently is the “nuts and bolts” of real policy disagreement.  Sadly in popular debates and the media disagreement is often portrayed as between “the experts vs the idiots”, but this framing seldom leads to any genuine understanding of opposing perspectives, and with it a reasonable compromise.

Chapter 13 covers a very topical issue given the pandemic- the prevalence of anxiety. 

“When I see a man anxious, I say, "What does this man want? If he did not want something which is not in his power, how could he be anxious?" For this reason a lute player when he is singing by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the theatre, he is anxious even if he has a good voice and plays well on the lute; for he not only wishes to sing well, but also to obtain applause: but this is not in his power. 

Let’s take some time to unpack anxiety.  Some degree of anxiety can be healthy and productive, helping us to perform better and focus.  For example, the anxiety a student might feel before an exam or a single person before a first date.  But taken too far, anxiety can be a destructive force, leading a person to ruminate endlessly in their head about something they cannot control (e.g. “will my date like me?”) and avoiding the actions needed to lean into, and work through, their anxiety (e.g. cancelling the date at the last minute vs risking rejection). 

EP notes how confidence is the antidote to anxiety.  He gives the example of a musician. If someone lacks musical skills they would be anxious about performing for others.  But to someone who has practiced and is competent as a musician, they will not be anxious.  Carrying that example over to the dating example, a person who is truly happy and accepting of who they are (i.e. their sense of self-esteem is not contingent upon a stranger liking them), and has some experience dating will not have anxiety about going on a first date.  They know that no one “rejects them’, but rather they just might not be the right match.  And that’s ok, you date people to find the right match (something that cannot be achieved without experiencing some mismatches).  The bottom line- action (and the experience and competence that comes with it) is the way to redress anxiety. 

Summarizing then a few of the topics that might be interesting for the group to focus on from Book 2 include:

1.      EP’s resolution of the so-called “paradox” of caution/confidence (and how that applies to death).

2. What different moral duties and obligations arise from your “different identities” (e.g. partner, parent, co-worker, citizen, human being) and how do you manage potential conflicts between these duties/obligations when they arise?

3.       humility- as you gain more life experience and insight have you become more or less humble?  What core conviction/belief have you changed your mind on?

4. Disagreement exercise:  think of some societal predicament there is strong disagreement about, and try to think of the most compelling counter-points to the position you take.

 5. Reflect on the prevalence of anxiety in society today.  How can we, both personally and in our culture more generally, reduce the burden and toll anxiety inflicts on so many people?  Do you think stoicism can be of real help for this problem?   

Should be a stimulating discussion!

Cheers,

Colin

Monday, November 01, 2021

 

Nature news reports on the effort to find people who are genetically resistant to SARS-CoV-2.  The research article is here.  An excerpt from the news item:

Imagine being born naturally resistant to SARS-CoV-2, and never having to worry about contracting COVID-19 or spreading the virus. If you have this superpower, researchers want to meet you, to enrol you in their study.... The first step is to narrow the search to people who have been exposed, without protection, to a sick person over an extended period, and have not tested positive or mounted an immune response against the virus. Of particular interest are people who shared a home and bed with an infected partner — pairs known as discordant couples.

Cheers, 

Colin