Reading Group on Stoicism (Post #4)

 

Epictetus The Discourses (Book I)

The Philosophy Meetup Group is continuing its reading group meetings on Stoicism, turning next to Epictetus, a Greek philosopher of the 1st and early 2nd centuries.  His original name  is not known, Epiktētos is the Greek word meaning “acquired” as Epictetus was a slave in the Roman empire as a boy. He became a freeman as an adult.

Epictetus (hereafter referred to as EP) refers to himself as "lame", some commentators speculate this refers to a leg injury afflicted on him by his slave owner when he was young, while other commentators suggest EP may have developed infirmity later in his life. He never wrote anything himself, his writings are the notes of his pupil Arrian.

Like with the reading group on Marcus Aurelius, I have not read any of the works of EP before. His work is something I have been meaning to read for a number of year now. Here is how A.A. Long summarizes the experience of learning about EP:

Epictetus is a thinker we cannot forget, once we have encountered him, because he gets under our skin. He provokes and he irritates, but he deals so trenchantly with life's everyday challenges that no one who knows his work can simply dismiss it as theoretically invalid or practically useless. In times of stress, Epictetans have attested, his recommendations make their presence felt.

Book 1 is composed of the following 16 chapters and titles:

Chapter 1:  Of the things which are in our Power, and not in our Power.

Chapter 2:  How a Man on every occasion can maintain his Proper Character.

Chapter 3:  How a man should proceed from the principle of God being the father of all men to the rest.

Chapter 4:  Of progress or improvement

Chapter 5:  Against the academics

Chapter 6:  Of providence

Chapter 7:  Of the use of sophistical arguments, and hypothetical, and the like

Chapter 8:  That the faculties are not safe to the uninstructed

Chapter 9:  How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed to the consequences.

Chapter 10:  Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome.

Chapter 11:  Of natural affection.

Chapter 12:  Of contentment.

Chapter 13:  How everything may he done acceptably to the gods

Chapter 14:  That the deity oversees all things.

Chapter 15:  What philosophy promises.

Chapter 16:  Of providence

Unlike Marcus Aurelius, who I found to be an easy author to follow as his Meditations were short “sound bites” on repeated themes, I found book I of EP’s Discourses a much more challenging read.  Sometimes there were very short passages that packed in profound wisdom and insight, and other times there were some lengthy passages I found perplexing and somewhat vexing.  Many examples deal with historical figures and stories which require having some knowledge about them to understand his point.  Like I did with MA, I will highlight just a few parts of EP’s writings that resonated with me, and offer some examples and critical comments to help stimulate some discussion and debate for the group.

I will begin with what I think is the foundational premise of EP’s stoicism, and stoicism more generally- this foundational premise has an epistemic and attitudinal component.  I am skipping ahead slightly into Book II (chapter 5), where EP states:

Thus in life also the chief business is this: distinguish and separate things, and say, "Externals are not in my power: will is in my power. Where shall I seek the good and the bad? Within, in the things which are my own. 

I would like to identify two distinct theses in EP’s foundational Stoic premise, what I will call the “epistemic claim” and the “attitudinal claim”:

Epistemic claim:  In life things fall into one of two categories- things within our control, and things beyond our control.

Attitudinal claim:  because I have not yet beyond Book I yet I am hesitant to state what I think EP’s attitudinal claim is, but I am confident one is there.  So far I think it is something like the following (I will refine this premise in further weeks as I read Books II and III):  normative values of good and bad arrive only from things within our control.  Ruminating about, having anger or anxiety about things beyond our control is folly/vice/self-inflicted and unnecessary suffering.

I see great potential, but also significant limitations, in this foundational Stoic premise.  First, I will note the “truisms” inherent in the epistemic claim. 

There are certainly things that are not within my control.  Here is a compelling list of things that certainly meet that description:

The weather- I cannot control if the weather tomorrow will be sunny and warm, or rainy and cold.

Natural disasters- I cannot control earthquakes, hurricanes, or tsunamis.

Luck:  when I roll the dice or pick the lottery numbers, I cannot control the outcome, it is pure chance.

 And there are things that are clearly within my control, such as:

           What clothes I will wear today to work.

           What I order on the lunch menu from the restaurant I am at.

            If I go to the gym today.

When life events are divided into this simplistic two-dimensional categorization, EP’s attitudinal prescription (the details of which I still need to discover) might sound very sage.  A person laying in bed ruminating “I hope tomorrow is sunny” is exerting energy stressing about something they cannot control.  At best this is wasteful, at worst it is detrimental to one’s wellbeing.  “Just let tomorrow unfold as it is meant to be” EP might say.  By contrast the person who wakes up in bed and says “today I will go to the gym” is focusing on something within their control, namely their motivation to improve their physical and mental health. So this is a good example of a healthy investment of one’s psychological energy- it is focused on something within our control that can benefit us.

The problem I have with this foundational Stoic premise, which I highlighted before with MA, is two-fold:

#1.  Many things in life fall between the category of “within our control” and “beyond our control”.  Many things are “somewhat” within our control.  Some examples:

 

Health- my health is “somewhat” in my control.  I can help reduce my risks of disease by exercising and eating a balanced diet.  But I cannot control aging and other many health developments. 

 

Wealth- my own personal financial position is “somewhat” within my control.  I can save money or overspend on things I cannot control.  But at the same time I cannot control inflation or global recessions.

 

Friendships- my group of friends is “somewhat” within my control.  I can vet and select the people I spend most of my time with.  But at the same time the pool of “available friends” is also influence by factors like where I live (large or small pool of candidates), my work schedule might limit the hours I am free to meet new people (e.g. shift work), etc. 

I highlight these “ambiguous” categories to reveal the constraint the foundational Stoic premise places on practical reason.  If someone gets the epistemic premise wrong concerning what is and is not within their control, then this could adversely impact their wellbeing.  For example, if someone believes “I cannot control my health” then they may decide there is no reason to stop smoking, wear a seat belt or get a vaccine because “health outcomes are beyond their control”.  Conversely the person who believes their health is 100% within their control will face a difficult life journey as they age and inevitably face health challenges.  The most health conscious diet and lifestyle choices will not, sadly, immunize a person from developing cancer or the other health maladies of late life.

#2.  The second problem with the life outlook of the foundational Stoic premise is is that it is overly individualistic.  There are things I, as an individual, cannot control but that we, collectively as a society, could influence (perhaps even “control”).  I as an individual person cannot influence climate change, but we as a society could.  I as an individual person cannot do much to abate persistent societal injustices (e.g. discrimination, inequality, etc.), but collectively we as a society could.  Stoicism does not seem to offer an emancipatory social/public ethic.  Perhaps the focus on god and providence provides EP with an “out” to my concern, but at the moment I think this is a significant shortcoming of Stoicism.

Why does this critique of EP matter?  Well, if everyone lived by this foundational Stoic creed we would not have planes, developed economies or public health.  Over 2000 years ago the following things were true: 

“Humans cannot fly, that is beyond our control”.

“Severe poverty is a fact of life, eliminating poverty is beyond our control”. 

“Plagues are a fact of life, we cannot protect populations from the high mortality count of infectious diseases”.

But today these claims are all untrue.  And they are untrue because some creative and ambitious thinkers were convinced that something they were told they could not do they did!  Let us call this the “progressive inspiration” (PI).  PI presents a challenge to the epistemic premise of Stoicism because it prescribes we have humility with respect to what we label “within” and “beyond” our control.  Self-driving cars, editing the human genome and putting people on the Moon are all examples of PI in action.  None would have been achieved by persons who had internalized the Stoic sentiment.   

Having said the above, I do think there is significant benefits to be reaped, even if only partially and provisionally, from the Stoic's foundational premise- “do not sweat the small things/things-you-cannot influence in life”.  A great deal of human suffering stems from contraventions of this sage prescription.

Now on to other parts of Book I.  In the first chapter of Book I he notes the primacy of reason:

The rational faculty… is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar, and other faculties, proves their uses and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else.

            EP then makes what I took to be one of his most profound statements, concerning the acceptance of death.  He remarks:  “I must die. If now, I am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour; after this I will then die. How? Like a man who gives up what belongs to another.”  This attitude of surrender is also one that I think can be helpfully empowering, but also fatalistic and imprudent.  We will all die, and in certain circumstances we should accept that our demise is imminent.  But in other circumstances there are actions we can take to reduce mortality risks (in the immediate and distant future)- wearing seatbelts when driving, quite smoking, look both ways when crossing the street, connect with other humans, etc.  So the acceptance of death should not be equated with an indifference towards life. I am not saying EP is expressing indifference (afterall he is prioritizing eating lunch), but I think stoicism does conflict with long-term planning, which includes health risk mitigation. 

Chapter 2 is on character, of which I will highlight two passages which illuminate EP’s emphasis on self-discipline, insight and values.  EP provides the example of a slave and holding a chamber pot for their master to urinate in.

But the rational and the irrational appear such in a different way to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particularly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of the rational and the irrational to the several things conformably to nature. But in order to determine the rational and the irrational, we use not only the of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate to each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason to hold a chamber pot for another, and to look to this only, that if he does not hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will not receive his food: but if he shall hold the pot, he will not suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to another man not only does the holding of a chamber pot appear intolerable for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to do this office for him. If, then, you ask me whether you should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you that the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not being scourged; so that if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the chamber pot. "But this," you say, "would not be worthy of me." Well, then, it is you who must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not I; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself; for men sell themselves at various prices.

            There are many points in this lengthy passage worth noting.  Firstly, I think EP is emphasizing the importance of having insight and self-knowledge.  For some slaves their dignity will not feel violated by holding their master’s chamber pot, but for others it will.  This perhaps suggests that EP’s stoicism does permit of an emancipatory ethic, and progressive change thus lays with those who decide to stand up for the values they will not compromise on. 

Secondly, I think the example also suggests that we cannot defer to the advice of others on how we should live, for they may hold values that are incongruent with those we hold.  A stoic strives to live authentically with the values they cherish most, not simply with the duties and values society prescribes they obey.   Reason, rather than custom or tradition, ought to serve as our moral compass.

If the example of holding a master’s chamber pot was not offputting enough for you, EP also considers a rather morbid example of an injured athlete who would have to castrate himself in order to survive.  EP claims:

In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother came to the athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, "Come, brother, what are you going to do? Shall we amputate this member and return to the gymnasium?" But the athlete persisted in his resolution and died. When some one asked Epictetus how he did this, as an athlete or a philosopher, "As a man," Epictetus replied, "and a man who had been proclaimed among the athletes at the Olympic games and had contended in them, a man who had been familiar with such a place, and not merely anointed in Baton's school. Another would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if he could have lived without it. Such is that regard to character which is so strong in those who have been accustomed to introduce it of themselves and conjoined with other things into their deliberations.

            What to make of this intriguing example?  I take this example to be about living in accordance with your values (in this case, the value of being an man and competitor vs merely surviving as a eunuch who would be less competitive as an Olympian).  The example suggests that there are values more important than surviving, and thus we should embrace a life authentic to those values.

            Chapter 4 is entitled “Of progress or improvement”, and I take it that the themes of growth and development in Stoicism is a major appeal for many people (including myself).  EP claims:

He who is making progress, having learned from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that happiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it, but he employs his aversion only on things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress toward virtue is progress toward each of these things. For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach toward this point.

            It may be helpful for us to reflect on this issue of progress further.  What events or experiences have been catalysts of progress or improvement in your own life?  And how did you progress?  What lessons did you learn?

One personal example from my own life has been the death of both my parents over the past 3 years.  I was very close to both parents, and the loss impacted me deeply.  But the grieving experience also helped me to grow.  I learned how to shift my connection with my parents from a “relationship of experience” to a “relationship of memory”.  Regulating my emotions in this sphere of life helped me learn how to apply the same attitude and skills to other things.  Acceptance and gratitude become my allies during time of pain and suffering.  I learned to be present with my grief, and to observe how attending to my feelings, and expressing them, helped me to cope with the fear of missing loved ones who had always been present and supportive in my life.  My feelings of “persistent loss and fear” were gradually abated and replaced by gratitude and memory.  In some respects I feel more close to my parents now than ever.  And this stems, I believe, from the fact that I realize how fortunate I was to have shared half a century together with such loving and caring parents.  I always had gratitude for my parents, but now that they are deceased this gratitude has intensified and is more present with me on a daily basis. 

The remaining chapters of Discourses deal with topics like providence, god, etc. which did not engage me as much, and thus I have nothing to add on those chapters.  But group members that wish to bring up those topics for discussion should certainly do so.  Posting a comment on the meetup page in advance about a particular passage or theme in advance of our meeting would be helpful.

In conclusion, a few topics we might consider:

#1.  The division between “things within our control” and “things beyond our control” [and how this applies to us as individuals vs collectively as a society]

#2.  The primacy of reason and philosophy.

#3.  Acceptance of death- how far should this go?

#4. What events or experiences have been catalysts of progress or improvement in your own life?  And how did you progress?  What lessons did you learn?

Cheers,

Colin

Reading Group on Stoicism (Post #3)

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations (BOOKS 9-12 summary)

 This is my final book summary for the philosophy Meetup reading group on MA’s Meditations, covering books 9-12.  Those interested in the two earlier summaries can find my notes for Books 1-4 here, and 5-8 here.

These final chapters touch on a number of foundational elements of MA’s stoicism, as well as a few new topics.  Book 9 starts with a new and important topic- justice.  Unfortunately MA provides scant details on what he thinks justice is.  The short reflection which starts Book 9 simply states what constitutes injustice:

1. Injustice is a kind of blasphemy. Nature designed rational beings for each other’s sake: to help—not harm—one another, as they deserve. To transgress its will, then, is to blaspheme against the oldest of the gods. And to lie is to blaspheme against it too.

 

I think there is some internal tension between this comment about injustice and other aspects of MA’s stoicism.  MA seems to be saying that “transgressing the will of Nature” is an injustice, that it prevents people “getting what they deserve”.  And yet throughout the Meditations MA constantly says that things unfold the way they were suppose to, according to Nature/logos, and that we should just accept what “is” and “meant to be”.  This strikes me as paradoxical.  MA asserts that if someone betrays another they have “transgressed the will of Nature”.  But MA also consoles that we should see such actions as “their problem, not ours”.  It was not clear to me what MA thought our responsibility was for correcting injustices.  Do we just accept them, as part of the “flow of life” that was meant to be, in its imperfection?  Or should we aspire to ensure people get what they deserve, by preventing injustice from occurring, and rectifying injustice when it does occur? 

In the translator’s notes, the editor notes that MA does not provide an account of justice.  And thus the reader will be left somewhat unsatisfied on this point.  The translator (full video lecture with translator is here: https://www.c-span.org/video/?173488-1/meditations-marcus-aurelius)  argues:

Marcus never defines what he means by justice, and it is important to recognize what the term implies and what it does not. All human beings have a share of the logos, and all have roles to play in the vast design that is the world. But this is not to say that all humans are equal or that the roles they are assigned are interchangeable. Marcus, like most of his contemporaries, took it for granted that human society was hierarchical, and this is borne out by the images he uses to describe it. Human society is a single organism, like an individual human body or a tree. But the trunk of the tree is not to be confused with the leaves, or the hands and feet with the head. Our duty to act justly does not mean that we must treat others as our equals; it means that we must treat them as they deserve. And their deserts are determined in part by their position in the hierarchy. Stoicism’s emphasis on the orderliness of the universe implies a similar orderliness and harmony in its parts, and part of its appeal to upper-class Romans may have been that it did not force its adherents to ask difficult questions about the organization of the society they lived in. (34-35)

 

While the topic of justice remains somewhat elusive in Meditations, what is prominent once again is the theme of “acceptance” vs “attachment to outcomes”, which is re-stated early in book 9:

 

1….  And to pursue pleasure as good, and flee from pain as evil —that too is blasphemous. Someone who does that is bound to find himself constantly reproaching nature—complaining that it doesn’t treat the good and bad as they deserve, but often lets the bad enjoy pleasure and the things that produce it, and makes the good suffer pain, and the things that produce pain. And moreover, to fear pain is to fear something that’s bound to happen, the world being what it is—and that again is blasphemy. While if you pursue pleasure, you can hardly avoid wrongdoing—which is manifestly blasphemous.  

 

This prescription stands in sharp contrast to the utilitarianism ethic which prescribes we seek to maximize happiness.  I have in mind Jeremy Bentham’s famous declaration that

 

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.  It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation)

 

While Bentham assumes it is our nature to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, MA seems to believe it is in our nature to just “be present and accepting” of what is, for what is is simply what is suppose to be.  I can see both appeals and limits of with both ethics.  Bentham’s hedonism, if applied to the pursuit of trite goods like excessive wealth and fame, would be a recipe for disaster.  And yet MA’s acceptance of what is appears to potentially undermine the possibility of aspiring to improve both our individual and collective wellbeing.  It is perhaps a matter of degree, that “acceptingness” can be a virtue when of the right degree and the proper kind, but a vice when those conditions are not met.

 

MA also returns to one of his favorite themes again early in Book 9- death.  He remarks:

 

3. Don’t look down on death, but welcome it. It too is one of the things required by nature. Like youth and old age. Like growth and maturity. Like a new set of teeth, a beard, the first gray hair. Like sex and pregnancy and childbirth. Like all the other physical changes at each stage of life, our dissolution is no different.

 

So this is how a thoughtful person should await death: not with indifference, not with impatience, not with disdain, but simply viewing it as one of the things that happen to us. Now you anticipate the child’s emergence from its mother’s womb; that’s how you should await the hour when your soul will emerge from its compartment.

 

21… Think about life with your grandfather, your mother, your adopted father. Realize how many other deaths and transformations and endings there have been and ask yourself: Was that so terrible?  Then neither will the close of your life be—its ending and transformation.

 

 Death is perhaps a good example to illustrate my point above regarding the degree and kind of acceptingness.  “Welcoming death” can be both a virtuous display of character, but also a vice.  For example, an example of the former would be displaying courage and grace after receiving the news that you have a late-stage fatal disease.  After anger and denial has subsided, I think some people come to accept (indeed embrace, as MA suggests) this fate.  They find some inner peace, and demonstrate great courage and resilience in the face of their prognosis that others find inspiring.  But there are other cases when “welcoming death” seems ill-advised and problematic.  A smoker who refuses to quit smoking and simply says “something has to kill you.  I am a good stoic, I see my nicotine addiction as “part of nature”, it was simply meant to be, as is any possible adverse health effect from my smoking.  If smoking reduces my lifespan that makes no difference, we all end up deceased.  Death (even by lung cancer) is simply something that happens to us”.  In both these cases the people seem to express sentiments endorsed by MA, but in my view only the former is sage, the latter is simply self-rationalizing their addiction. 

 

One of my favorite quotes in Book 9 concerns MA’s description of how to pray.  I think this strategy of reframing our aspirations can have a genuine benefit in helping us get over the pain of unfulfilled goals/aspirations.  It is this passage here:

40.  Start praying like this and you’ll see.

 Not “some way to sleep with her”—but a way to stop wanting to.

 Not “some way to get rid of him”—but a way to stop trying.

 Not “some way to save my child”—but a way to lose your fear.

 Redirect your prayers like that, and watch what happens.

 These prayers tap into the wisdom of “acceptance and commitment therapy”.  When we attach deep value to “ends” that cannot be realized we suffer unnecessarily.  So I certainly agree with MA that such ends should be redefined in a way more conducive to our inner peace and flourishing. He gives the example of Epicurus who, when faced with his own illness and death, kept his mind on philosophy vs his failing health:

41. Epicurus: “During my illness, my conversations were not about my physical state; I did not waste my visitors’ time with things of that sort, but went on discussing philosophy, and concentrated on one point in particular: how the mind can participate in the sensations of the body and yet maintain its serenity, and focus on its own well-being. Nor did I let my doctors strut about like grandees. I went on living my life the way it should be lived.”

I will share a personal story that I think resonates with this stoic insight.  When my father (who was the most avid reader of this blog!) first received his cancer prognosis he (understandably) was focused on the loss represented by this tragic development.  In particular, the future events (e.g. grandchildren’s careers and marriage, etc.) with family he would not be able to share with us.  Because I knew he valued connections with the family so deeply, I suggested he try an exercise and write out a personal narrative from an important event in every decade of his life, something most of the family did not know that we would learn about him after he was gone.  He ended up taking this suggestion much further, writing out his complete life story from childhood through to the end of his life, highlighting different achievements and travels, and the evolution of the family, from his children to his grandchildren.  Leaving “his story” for the family, in his own words, I think was therapy for him during his last year of life.  It enabled his mind to become immersed in the gratitude of the achievements of his actual life vs ruminating about the loss of things in the future that had never happened.  I think this exercise gave him some solace, and made accepting his fate more palatable. 

In Book 10 MA offers a short list of epithets:

8. Epithets for yourself: Upright. Modest. Straightforward. Sane. Cooperative. Disinterested.  Try not to exchange them for others.  And if you should forfeit them, set about getting them back

Keep in mind that “sanity” means understanding things— each individual thing—for what they are. And not losing the thread.

And “cooperation” means accepting what nature assigns you—accepting it willingly

And “disinterest” means that the intelligence should rise above the movements of the flesh—the rough and the smooth alike. Should rise above fame, above death, and everything like them.

I wonder where personal ambition and political aspirations fit into the picture here.  In 25 MA claims that “When a slave runs away from his master, we call him a fugitive slave” and thus one of the problematic aspects of MA’s appeals to “Nature” and “accepting the way things are” is that it can be construed as a prescription for accepting one’s subordinate position in a hierarchy and societal injustice.  Sure stoicism might sound like an emancipatory personal ethic for a Roman Emperor, but I think it has more dire consequences when it is invoked as a personal or collective ethic for those who should aspire for a better future when the status quo is grossly unjust. 

In Book 11 MA reflects on the good life:

16. To live a good life:  We have the potential for it. If we can learn to be indifferent to what makes no difference. This is how we learn: by looking at each thing, both the parts and the whole.  Keeping in mind that none of them can dictate how we perceive it. They don’t impose themselves on us. They hover before us, unmoving. It is we who generate the judgments— inscribing them on ourselves. And we don’t have to. We could leave the page blank—and if a mark slips through, erase it instantly.

 

The key for MA is our capacity to self-author the narratives of our lives vs being imprisoned to beliefs, desires and goals that frustrate, anger and depress us.

MA highlights anger a few times, and seems to be of the view that it is a toxic emotional response to life events. He remarks:

26. To be angry at something means you’ve forgotten:  That everything that happens is natural.  That the responsibility is theirs, not yours.

Overall, I have really enjoyed reading and engaging with MA’s Meditations.  These final four Books provide us with many topics to discuss:

(a)   What is justice/injustice?

(b)  Should we be “accepting” of death?  Is there a difference between a healthy acceptance of our mortality vs eschewing public health measures which could prolong life?

(c)   Are the epithets of being upright, modest, straightforward, sane, cooperative and disinterested.  Do you agree with this list?  Are there other things missing from it? 

(d)  Should we pursue happiness and try to avoid pain? Why/why not?

(e)   What do you think of MA’s “re-framing” exercise for prayers?

There is a lot I like about stoicism as a philosophy, and parts I have reservations or disagree with.  I hope to read a few more primary sources in the months to come.  Next on the list is Epictetus!

 

Cheers,

Colin

Science and Political Theory (Narrowing the gap)

The most recent pandemic, coupled with the rapid rise of "non-ideal" theory in political philosophy/theory, will hopefully convince normative theorists that science and science-policy ought to be a the forefront of our theorizing (vs virtually non-existent, which has been the norm for too long).  No other area of public policy decision-making will have as profound an impact on the health, wealth and happiness of human populations this century as science policy.  

My personal journey down this path started in the year 2000, when the race to sequence the human genome captured my curiosity and imagination.  Tackling these topics in this way was (and continues to be) very challenging as very few scholars in the field were receptive to non-ideal theory at the time.  Taking seriously real-world empirical facts like population aging, multi-morbidity, and the ultimate and proximate causation of disease are still a stretch for many of my colleagues who have only recently come to expand the scope of their theorizing the moral landscape to take seriously globalization, colonialism, racism, climate change, and patriarchy.  But novel insights from the biological sciences remain outside the discipline's purview.  And this is very unfortunate.   

Here are a few details of the evolution of my intellectual journey into this domain, a journey that started over 20 years ago, and still has so far to go!

From the Introduction to Biologically Modified Justice:

As I began to follow the field of human genetics, and to think about the importance of science more generally, I realized that there was very little written by political theorists on these topics. Over the years the neglect of science, especially the biomedical sciences, began to trouble me more and more. It troubled me both as a teacher and as a scholar.  As a teacher I found it disturbing that my students learned about topics such as justice, freedom, and equality but do not really learn about the important role science and innovation play in helping humanity create more fair and humane societies. Current debates about distributive justice often give students the impression that justice only involves the distribution of wealth and income, or giving priority to basic liberties like free speech. But government decisions to stifle or promote basic and applied scientific research can also have profound impacts on our life prospects. What constitutes ‘well-ordered’ science? Would we know unjust science policies when we see them? Neglecting these issues comes with great peril, as many of the most pressing challenges humanity faces this century will require new knowledge and innovation.

The divide between theoretical discussions of justice and the topics of science and science policy also troubled me as a scholar. My plans to write a book on genetics and justice were stifled and continually delayed by the fact that these issues do not fit neatly into the theoretical positions and discussions that have dominated debates in political theory for the past four decades. Most theorists presuppose that justice requires us to distribute things external to us (e.g. wealth, education, legal rights, etc.).  So how could we make sense of the idea of extending the domain of justice to include the distribution of things internal to our own biology, like our genes?

….Rather than opting for an ‘add genetics and stir’ approach, I decided to start afresh, and to use the genetic revolution as a way of bringing to the fore some methodological concerns which I believe theorists ought to give more consideration to. Hence I ended up opting for a contextual approach. This approach takes human biology seriously (e.g. our susceptibility to different kinds of disease), and draws the theorist’s attention (rather than blinding her) to a number of relevant considerations (e.g.limited public funding available for basic research).

….The intellectual gulf that exists between the humanities/social sciences and the natural sciences should be particularly troubling to political theorists.  Historically, the seminal works in political theory took seriously empirical insights from diverse disciplines. What would Aristotle’s contribution to political theory be, for example, if he cared little about the relevance of insights from biology? Or imagine what the state of political theory would be if Thomas Hobbes or John Locke expressed indifference to, rather than excitement about and engagement with, the scientific revolution of their day.

Cheers, 

Colin

Origins of Virus (Podcast)

 

Science has an interesting debate on the "natural jump from animals to humans" vs "lab leak" theories about the origins of SARS-CoV-2 here.  

It is rather astonishing that, nearly 2 years since the original outbreak and the world is still in the grips of this pandemic, and we are still no closer to an answer about the origins of the virus.  

Cheers, 

Colin