A Tale of Two Johns (Part 2)
As noted in my earlier post, Rawls was the focus of my PhD thesis back in 1999, and for a period of time (1997-2004) I considered myself "A Rawlsian". During that time I published the following articles, broadly defending or refining Rawls's project:
Colin Farrelly, “Does Rawls Support the Procedural Republic?” Politics 19(1) (1999): 29-35.
Colin Farrelly, “Incentives and the Natural Duties of Justice” Politics 20(1) (2000): 19-24.
Then, after I had more fully processed a number of critical developments that occurred in the early 2000s, such as the sequencing of the human genome (which inspired me to learn more about human genetics, evolutionary biology and biogerontology), and Sept 11th (2001), and my switching from teaching in philosophy departments to political science (in 2001), I became the "non-ideal" critic of Rawls that I still am today. The shift is most evident in these two older publications, and a more recent book chapter:
Colin Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation” Political Studies 55 (2007): 844–864.
Justice, Democracy and Reasonable Agreement (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).
When I reflect upon my "Rawlsian past" I put the allure it had for me at the time to what was perhaps Rawls's most influential insight in political philosophy- some inequalities in life are the product of choice, and other inequalities are the product of chance. Justice, for Rawls, was concerned only with mitigating the latter. This is the position known as "luck egalitarianism", the dominant theory in analytic political philosophy during the 1980s and 1990s. While I enjoyed following these debates at the time, I really wish the discipline had instead taken more seriously a much more profound, and important, insight from the evolutionary biologist John Haldane.
Haldane was one of a number of important biologists (Fisher, Hamilton, and Medawar) in the middle of the 20th century that made significant contributions to the biology of aging. The critical insight Haldane made, which has been a focal point of my academic research for nearly the past 20 years, is expressed eloquently by him in the following passage from his 1963 book review of the life tables for England and Wales (1841-1960). Haldane remarked that "Natural selection sees to it that genes causing early death or sterility are fairly rare. On the other hand post-reproductive mortality seems to be genetically determined to a large extent." (J.B.S. Haldane, Journal of Genetics (1963) 58: 464.) The image below depicts what Haldane was saying.
Haldane's
sentiment expresses a similar version of Rawls's insight about luck
egalitarianism, namely that some inequalities are unchosen- but Haldane's
insight has profoundly more important empirical insights and practical consequences. Here are a few
of the former:
(1)
we have a biology.
(2)
that biology has a history (a history shaped by the interplay between environment and genes).
(3) genes are the basic unit of physical and functional heredity.
(4)
aging is a product of evolutionary neglect.
(5) evolutionary history influences the pattern of disease, frailty and disability we see over the course of the human lifespan. [the social significance of this has only recently been realized, as populations now age due to reductions in early and mid-life mortality and declining birth rates]
In terms of the practical and social implications of Haldane's insights, I have spent 2 decades exploring these issues in the following research projects:
Genetics and Ethics: An Introduction (Polity Books, 2018).
Biologically Modified Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
“Imagination and Idealism in the Medical Sciences of an Aging World” Journal of Medical Ethics 2022.
Colin Farrelly, “Aging, Geroscience and Freedom” Rejuvenation Research 22(2) 2019: 163-170.
Colin Farrelly, “Equality and the Duty to Retard Human Aging” Bioethics 24(8) (2010): 384-94.
Colin Farrelly, “Why Aging Research?” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1197 (2010): 1–8.
Colin Farrelly, “3 Wishes” Journal of Evolution and Technology 20(1) (2008): 23-28.
whew... it has been quite the journey exploring these fascinating issues and seeing how my ideas have evolved over time!! I have no regrets about stepping out of the theoretical armchair of ideal theory in 2005 and engaging in interdisciplinary research to tackle the real-world problems pertaining to human genetics, science policy and population aging. And I feel like the journey is still only at the beginning stage for me. There are so many other issues I would like to explore in the years to come.
Haldane's insight compels one to adopt an interdisciplinary perspective, and the social and political implications of it are profound. By contrast Rawls's insight now seems, if I am being open and honest, to be intellectually impoverished and politically inert. Perhaps it could have been the focus of a handful of journal papers over a 2-3 year period, but not something to debate and discuss for a few decades as a central problem for the discipline.
Like
in my original 2009 post "A Tale of Two Johns", I ask my readers
to consider the following counterfactual...
Where would the field of political philosophy be today if the
field had spent as much time and energy examining and debating Haldane's
insight about how evolution impacts our life prospects as we have Rawls's luck egalitarianism?
Imagine
if political philosophers had spent 20 years engaging with the social
implications of the biology of aging rather than the abstract, conceptual dance
initiated by luck egalitarianism. The journals of the discipline would be
littered with articles engaging with evolutionary biology, the social
implications of population aging, and the fascinating technological
implications of the genetic revolution and geroscience. Instead we were
left with a discipline that was ill-equipped to address science policy.
Perhaps the one issue that has gained traction in the last two decades is
climate change, though that may have more to do with it's potential coherence
to some of the conceptual, theoretical terrain of the abstract debates about
justice than the complexities and nuance of the actual science and policy
landscape. But I digress...
I of course have a great deal of respect for the contributions of John Rawls himself, he was a great political philosopher (if I didn't think this, I wouldn't have spent so much of my time engaging with him as a thinker!). My criticism is really of the dominance of the Rawls-industry that flourished for a number of decades from the 1970s into the early 2000s. Things are different now. But I think there are still important lessons to be learned by looking at the "opportunity costs" of ideal theory. If we do not learn from the mistakes of the past, we are bound to repeat them again.... and again....!
Cheers,
Colin